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Coercive diplomacy; the combination of threats and/or use of force to alter an adversary’s 
behavior is a threat- based strategy used in crisis management when regular diplomacy fails. 
This thesis examines coercive diplomacy theory by testing P.V. Jakobsen’s conceptual “ideal 
policy” framework identifying four minimum conditions for coercive diplomacy success. The 
ideal policy is a parsimonious framework derived to determine the probability for success or 
explain coercive diplomacy outcomes post hoc. The ideal policy represents a theoretical shift 
from the quest of understanding an adversary to focus on the coercer’s ability and power to 
hurt. This builds on a rational calculation of balance of capabilities because it’s not always 
possible to obtain information of motives and intentions in a given crisis. The ideal policy 
framework identifies four necessary, but not always sufficient conditions for coercive success, 
and ensures generalizability across cases.    
The aim of the theory- testing is to evaluate if the conceptual framework can explain recent 
coercive diplomacy outcomes post hoc. The empirical material builds on two American (and 
allies) coercive diplomacy attempts directed towards Muammar Gadhafi’s Libya. The first 
attempt proved successful when the U.S. forced Gadhafi to abandon his WMD program based 
on a combination of coercion, inducements and assurances as the ideal policy framework 
proscribed. The second attempt proved unsuccessful when the lack of tangible assurances and 
inducements for compliance made the ideal policy framework correctly predict failure in the 
absence of one or more minimum conditions for success.  
The ideal policy conditions served as the basis for a comparative analysis of the two cases as 
stipulated by the structured, focused comparison method. This analysis allowed for a more 
fine grained assessment of the cases by looking at similarities and differences between the 
two coercion attempts, and identifying the interests guiding the main coercer’s behavior. The 
analysis found that the changed strategic context influenced how the threats were issued and 
perceived. Gadhafi underestimated the credibility of the threats because it was made 
conditional on international support. The analysis confirmed past empirical findings that 
humanitarian cases of low national interests and coalitional coercion efforts has lower 
probability for success and highlighted the importance of inducements and credible 
assurances. It also found that the “second order” interests among the main coercers explain 
the different proceedings in the coercion attempt.  
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“There is a difference between taking what you want and making someone give it to you, 
between fending off assault and making someone afraid to assault you, between holding what 
people are trying to take and making them afraid to take it, between losing what someone can 
forcibly take and giving it up to avoid risk or damage”(Schelling2008:2).  
These words from Thomas Schelling’s classic “Arms and Influence” from 1966 illustrates 
some of the risks and opportunities states in the anarchic world of international relations have 
to deal with. In the jungle of IR, with the lack of central legitimate governance, the law of the 
jungle rules; it’s the survival of the strongest and the behavior of the strong determines the 
fate of the weak. Security is the state’s main objective, any state has to be aware of how to 
create and maintain stability, how to act to resolve conflicts, and how to use force to avert 
threats and achieve foreign policy goals. The strategies available for these objectives ranges 
from the deterrence and coercion to blackmail, intimidation and brute force, and hinges on the 
ability and will to use military force. 
This research investigates one of these strategies, coercive diplomacy; by examining the logic 
and abstract theory of the coercion, testing the operationalized variables in the ideal policy 
conceptual framework and making a comparative analysis of two recent coercive diplomacy 
attempts. Theory is not a blueprint for strategy, the general abstract theory of coercive 
diplomacy had to be operationalized into a conceptual framework for empirical testing to 
contribute to the building of cumulative knowledge of coercive diplomacy. This work has 
previously been hampered by a lack of common terminology, limited systematic testing and 
reluctance to address known policy problems (Jakobsen2011:157). The purpose of this 
research is to build on Jakobsen’s effort to solve these problems by adapting some of his 
solutions; including moving away from unattainable complex analytical frameworks, bringing 
back Schelling’s rationality assumption, provide clear definitions and do an empirical testing 
of the ideal policy framework explaining recent coercive diplomacy outcomes based on 
minimal understanding of the adversary.   
Coercive diplomacy is a threat- based foreign policy strategy where one seeks to achieve 
foreign policy goals by “marrying diplomacy and military force” (Jakobsen2016:281). 
Alexander George has defined it as ‘forceful persuasion’ which is “the attempt to get a target- 
a state, a group (or groups) within a state, or a non-state actor- to change objectionable 
behavior through either the threat of using force or the actual use of limited 
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force”(Art2004:6); (George1993:5). The use of force to achieve foreign policy objectives did 
not – contrary to many predictions- go away with the changed security context after the Cold 
War. Instead, it removed some of the systemic constraints on American use of military power 
without having another superpower to counterbalance it. As the only global military actor, the 
U.S. continued to rely heavily on its military instruments to counter threats to its interests and 
achieve its foreign policy goals (Art2004:3/4). Consequently, military force has been 
employed increasingly the last two decades. Quite a few of the instances of use of force is 
what we can define as coercive diplomacy attempts. In fact coercive diplomacy should be the 
ideal strategy for the powerful and mighty, but past empirical studies reveals a paradox; “the 
U.S and its Western allies have not been able to translate military power into adversary 
compliance” (Jakobsen2011; Arreguin-Toft:2001). One study found 16 attempts from 1990 to 
2001, another 36 western attempts from 1990 to 2005 with a mixed, if not outright bad record 
of success. (Jakobsen2011:154) (Art2004:12/13).This poor track- record should not 
discourage the use of coercive diplomacy, but encourage better theoretical understanding and 
conceptual improvements to be translated into better strategy.  
1.1 Topic and Research Question   
The topic of this research is to study American use of coercive diplomacy after the Cold War 
and assess existing theory by use of new empirical data. The theoretical basis for the thesis is 
the works of George (1971/1991) and Schelling (1966) synthesized into an “ideal policy” 
conceptual framework by P.V. Jakobsen (1998/2016). The “ideal policy” is a parsimonious 
conceptual framework crystallizing four necessary, but not sufficient minimum requirements 
for coercive diplomacy success. It’s expected that a coercive diplomacy attempt fails if the 
conditions are not implemented, but the minimum conditions does not guarantees success, 
because it leaves out factors outside the coercer’s control such as psychological and ideational 
variables. However, the framework has a good empirical track- record, and “is designed to 
determine the probability of coercive diplomacy success in a given crisis or to explain 
coercive diplomacy outcomes with as few explanatory factors as 
possible”(Jakobsen2016:284/285). 
This research can be described as a dual investigation: Firstly, it investigates the explanatory 
range of the ideal policy framework to evaluate if it can explain two recent American coercive 
diplomacy outcomes post hoc. Secondly, it undertakes a comparative analysis of the two 
empirical cases to identify similarities and differences between the two coercion attempts. 
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The ideal policy framework is of threefold use; firstly as the basis for conceptual- 
development and refinement, secondly for empirical testing, and lastly as the basis for a 
comparison between the two cases. The conceptual- development part of the thesis consists of 
conceptual amendment by expanding one of the minimum conditions for success. The theory- 
testing is based on two coercive diplomacy attempts directed towards Muammar Gadhafi’s 
Libya. The first one aimed to prevent nuclear proliferation in 2003 and the second a 
coalitional effort to hinder mass atrocities in Benghazi 2011. The comparison is made 
according to the structured, focused comparison method by only looking at the targeted 
relevant aspect of the phenomenon. 
The research question aims to assess whether the ideal policy theory can explain and predict 
the outcome of recent coercive diplomacy attempts. The conceptual framework- testing is 
based on two hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: A coercive diplomacy attempt will be successful if the four “minimum 
conditions for success” outlined in the ideal policy are present.    
Hypothesis 2: A coercive diplomacy attempt will be unsuccessful if one or more of the 
“minimum conditions for success” outlined in the ideal policy are not present.  
Furthermore, the qualitative approach of structured focused comparison allows us to produce 
valuable generic knowledge of coercive diplomacy by asking “structured” general questions 
to each case to guide and standardize data collection while simultaneously looking at only 
certain and similar aspects of the historical cases to make it truly comparable 
”(George&Bennet2005:67). The general question informing the data gathering in this case is 
the minimum conditions for success. The ideal policy variables are time- tested and ensure 
inclusion of only relevant aspects explaining the phenomenon.  
The operationalization of generic knowledge and general abstract theory into variables in the 
conceptual ideal policy framework is not a strategy in itself, but it provides useful knowledge 
and information for policymakers making strategic calculations in real time. This enables us 
to better understand how and under which circumstances coercive diplomacy should be 
utilized and supports the last goal of the thesis; to contribute to Jakobsen’s (2011) efforts to 
bridging the gap between theory and practice in foreign policy. This is important because 
strategy is about choice, and we need more empirical knowledge about coercive diplomacy 
theory for the decision- makers to make accurate predictions and policy prescriptions. The 
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ability of a leadership to read the situation and calculate dangers and opportunities can be the 
difference between victory and defeat, and in the realm of security politics, it means life or 
death 
1.2. Definitions 
The conceptualization of coercion theory into operational definitions of the phenomenon 
requires elaboration of the terminology and definitions used throughout the thesis. 
Coercive Diplomacy “the attempt to get a target- a state, a group (or groups) within a state, 
or a non-state actor- to change objectionable behavior through either the threat of using force 
or the actual use of limited force”(Art2004:6); (George1993:5). It “seeks persuade the 
opponent to cease aggression rather than bludgeon him into stopping(Craig 
&George1995:196) The means of use to change objectionable behavior is either by the threats 
of using force or the actual use of limited force”(Art2004:6). The strategy usually includes 
both military threats and/or use of limited power and positive inducements to seek 
cooperation from the opponent. The former is by definition always a part of strategy the latter 
is according to the ideal policy necessary for success. “Coercion is to draw a line and 
commands the adversary to step across it, or else...” (Sechser&Fuhrmann2017:27). In other 
words to initiate or undo action already embarked on. Having Gadhafi halting his nuclear 
program or stop targeting civilians as opposed to a general warning before any action has 
taken place.   
Threats: Is about communication. The target of a coercive threat has to be aware of it to be 
able to act on it. It has to know what it should do to avoid the threat from being carried out. 
So a threat in coercive diplomacy is always coupled with a demand. The target has to stop or 
undo what they are doing or planning to do or they will face consequences. A threat can be 
stated publicly and explicitly or being implied and veiled by both words and actions. 
“Nonverbal communication often emerges from the structure and development of the 
situation” (George1993:9). The adversary will usually understand what kind of behavior the 
coercer want to change, so it doesn’t have to be spelled out, but often the threat can prove 
more efficient when it is communicated clearly with an ultimatum.  
Limited force is defined as use of force that still let the adversary “retain the capacity for 
organized military resistance”(Pape1996:13). “Force is limited when it does, and is not 
intended to leave the adversary defenseless, and without ability to fight back” 
(Freedman1998:16; Jakobsen2011:162/3). It makes the definition observable and easier to 
11 
 
measure, since “it includes communication of the limited intent to the adversary and that the 
military operations do not achieve decisive outcomes” (Jakobsen2011:163). Limited force is 
often contrasted with brute force, which is intended to take what the state want by massive 
use of military force, instead of convincing the adversary to give it up by itself, based on fear 
of consequences for not complying.   
Positive inducements: Is the so called “carrot” in international negotiations. The promise of 
something good or positive if the adversary complies with the demands. It can be a policy 
concessions or economic favor. In coercive diplomacy it will always be coupled with a 
“stick” (negative inducements) because a positive- sum negotiation would not involve threats 
of coercive character, but the inclusion of carrots along with sticks, make the coercive effort 
more persuasive than just “threatening with a thick stick with a heavy end”. The ideal policy 
therefore includes positive inducements and assurances as a necessary condition for success. 
Assurances: An assurance is given to the adversary to promise compliance would not be 
followed by new demands. It’s what Schelling’s called “clarity concerning the precise terms 
of settlement if the crisis in his ‘theory of comepllence’. The assurance can build trust 
between the two parties and make it more beneficial to comply for the adversary, but should 
be conditional on compliance with the demands(Schelling2008:74). The starkest assurance an 
adversary can get is promise of his own survival. The coercer can also give assurances against 
pressure to give up more territory after an adversary has agreed to give up some or against 
demand for more money after an initial payment. The credibility of assurances is just as 
important as of the threat. 
1.3. Operationalization 
The work to operationalize the abstract theory and past empirical knowledge to testable 
variables is already done by P.V. Jakobsen in his ideal policy framework. The research aims 
to study the explanatory range of coercive diplomacy theory by testing existing theory, 
formulated in two hypotheses, on new empirical cases. The hypothesis testing is crude and 
simple and based on dichotomized variables with only two values, whether the ideal policy 
conditions was present or not.  
1.4 The Dependent Variable  
The dependent variable in this study is “the explanatory range of coercive diplomacy theory”, 
whether the ideal policy can predict or explain coercive diplomacy attempts. The variables are 
dichotomized into two values; positive or negative, that is whether the theoretical conditions 
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(independent variables) are present or absent. The first hypothesis is proved true if all the four 
independent variables are present in a positive outcome, but false if the outcome is negative 
with all variables present or if the outcome is positive without all the independent variables 
present. This means the ideal policy framework is validated and explain and predict coercive 
diplomacy success when all the four theoretical conditions/ independent variables are present 
and failure if one or more are negative and the attempt is unsuccessful 
Likewise, the second hypothesis is proved true if one or more of the minimum conditions are 
absent and the coercive diplomacy attempt is unsuccessful. The ideal policy will fail if a 
coercive diplomacy attempt is successful without having all the minimum conditions for 
success present, or if an attempt is unsuccessful with all the minimum conditions present.   
 1.5 Independent Variables/ Theoretical Conditions 
The independent variables are all based on the theoretical conditions outlined by 
George(1971/ 1993) and Schelling (2008) and synthesized by Jakobsen in his ideal policy 
(2011/ 2016). The ideal policy is the minimum condition for success:  
The independent variables: 
1. A threat of force or limited use of force to defeat the opponent or deny them their 
objectives quickly with little cost 
2) A sense of urgency or deadline for compliance 
3) An offer of inducement for compliance 
4) An assurance to the adversary against future demands 
The ideal policy framework has been subject to one refinement and one amendment. The 
refinement includes adding “use of limited force” to the first variable. This is in line with 
Jakobsen’s intentions, as it is part of the definition of the phenomenon, and since he 
operationalized the meaning of limited force in his effort to make the conceptual framework 
policy relevant. He defined limited force 1) a communication of limited intent to the 
adversary and 2) military operations that do not achieve decisive 
outcomes(Jakobsen2011:163).  The amendment of the framework is based on the inclusion of 
“sense of urgency” as an alternative to a deadline to the second minimum condition. This will 
reduce the explanatory range of the framework by making it less specific, but make it include 
more coercive diplomacy attempts by lowering the conceptual threshold for success. This is 
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based on the changed nature of diplomacy with less room for secrecy in the age of mass 
media, and on the empirical fact that a publicly expressed deadline can be counterproductive 
to a positive outcome because it raises the cost of compliance and potentially undermines the 
diplomacy part – inducements and assurances- of the strategy. The amendment would foster a 
better equilibrium between coercion and diplomacy.   
1.6. Relevance and Value 
Analyzing the explanatory range of ideal policy framework is important for many reasons: 
first and foremost conceptualization of theory and understanding of the dynamics behind 
threat based foreign policy strategies can results in better policies with more successful 
outcomes, and more caution and restrain in use of force when that is called for. “An improved 
theory doesn’t necessarily lead to better practice, but it’s nevertheless a prerequisite, which 
makes it worth focusing on”(Jakobsen2011:154). Coercive diplomacy would perhaps in some 
reader’s minds, be equaled to a “warmonger strategy”, since increases the stakes and resolves 
conflict with the possible use of military force, rather than just words. But as George reminds 
us; “sometimes [coercive diplomacy] can stop or undo an adversary’s effort to alter status quo 
situation that itself endangers the peace, or which already involves naked military 
aggression”(George:1993:xi). The second case is a good example, where a successful 
coercive diplomacy attempt, could have avoided mass atrocities on rebels/ civilians and the 
power vacuum created by Gadhafi’s fall that turned the country in to a failed 
state(Lacher2017:149). Empirical studies show that use of coercion has increased in the post- 
cold war environment (Art&Cronin2004:12/13), and made it a necessary tool in the foreign 
policy toolbox. A greater understanding of the theory can help avert coercion attempts by 
engaging in successful counter- coercion. The use of Libyan cases allows us to study a 
successful and unsuccessful attempt where many variables were constant, given the proximity 
in time, and the fact that it was the same Gadhafi- regime in power during both attempts. The 
first case proved it was possible to coerce Gadhafi, so the question would be why didn’t it 
work the second time? Lastly, a parsimonious framework less dependent on contextual 
variables, intelligence and understanding of the adversary which has proved difficult if not 































The best way to start a scientific inquiry is to review previous literature to build the research 
on existing science and theories to avoid duplications and trivial findings. A literature review 
should in Diana Ridley’s words “give a picture of the state of knowledge of the major 
research questions in the research area and give background and justification for research 
undertaken” (Ridley2012:3/4). The following section will give a brief overview of the history 
of international security studies (ISS) and provide some background on the strategic context 
for the U.S. - Libya relations. A more thorough review of the theoretical contributions in the 
literature is outlined in the theory chapter.    
2.1. Sketching the Field of International Security Studies 
Coercion theories are situated within the field of international security studies (ISS). ISS 
started out as an independent field of study and grew out of debates over how to protect the 
state against external and internal threats after the Second World War 
(Hansen&Buzan2009:8). Wæver and Buzan holds that the main reason for the emergence of 
strategic studies in the immediate post- WW2 world was “the need for civilian experts to 
balance the military leadership, driven by technological developments and political 
consideration of long term mobilization (especially in the US)”(Wæver&Buzan2016:420). 
Politicians and leaders have to be able to think strategically and make thoughtful decision 
about the use of force. This strategic know-how makes ISS an important field of study. The 
early research efforts got criticism for validating “bad” government polices leading to wars, 
rearmament and escalating security dilemmas. 
The constricted research focus is illustrated by Walt’s definition of ISS as “the study of the 
threat, use and control of military force”(Walt1991:212).  Indeed, for a long period ISS was a 
narrow military power oriented field preoccupied with the state’s use of military force in 
international relations (IR), but also on the foundations of military power by including 
economic and socio- political structures of the state in the analysis (Hansen&Buzan2009:16). 
The research focus gradually expanded from how and why states create, maintain and use 
military power, to other security aspects including ideational, environmental and identity 
issues (Hansen&Buzan2009:16). Nowadays it’s hard to demarcate the difference between ISS 
and parts of IR, because of the significant overlap at least with the realist part of IR. ISS is 
thus seen as an integrated sub-field of international relations. “The broadening, deepening, 
extending and focusing” of security studies research scope begun in the 1980s(Vaughan- 
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Williams2010:17) and made the overlap between the disciplines even greater with inclusion 
of non- traditional methods and study objects in both field.  
The threat- based strategies were developed in the Cold War context. The grave implications 
of nuclear weapons and the bipolar structurer, with two dominating superpowers; the US and 
the Soviet Union created an unprecedented security environment. This was the basis for much 
of the deterrence theory, models of simple games of chicken or prisoner’s dilemma; often 
used to logically explain and possibly predict the great power behavior in a nuclear 
showdown, but luckily never tested empirically given the enormous amount of destruction a 
nuclear confrontation would create. In that sense nuclear weapons put strict constraints on the 
two superpowers avoiding direct confrontations. This did not prevent covert warfare and 
proxy wars, and both superpowers were active around the globe throughout the 
period(Westad2005:396).  
The 1970s brought research topics such as perceptions, arms race theory, proliferation of 
weapons and utility of force(Wæver&Buzan2016:422). Coercive diplomacy theory came at 
the end of this so called “Golden Age”, the experiences from the Vietnam War and Cuban 
crisis made George et al. coin the term “coercive diplomacy” as opposed to compellence, 
another form of threat based strategy, when developing policy relevant theory in the book 
“Limits of Coercive Diplomacy”(1971).  
Threat- Based Strategies share as the name indicates a reliance on the use of threats, which 
is commonly defined as “an expression of intention to inflict evil, injury or damage” 
(Merriam- Webster dictionary) to achieve the security policy objective. The threat in this case 
has to be connected to use of military force. It can be part of a reactive or proactive strategy, 
often divided into deterrence and compellence. The phenomenon of interest in this thesis 
“coercive diplomacy” is categorized as a variety of compellence. The literature on threat- 
based strategies consist of a plethora of names and definitions which contributes to 
terminological confusion; Jakobsen identified a wide range of strategies such as “armed 
suasion, coercion, coercive diplomacy, coercive inducements, coercive military strategy, 
compellence, forceful persuasion, gunboat diplomacy, military persuasion and finally 
strategic coercion”(Jakobsen2011:158). Agreeing on definitions and terminology is rarely a 
straight forward, clear-cut thing in social science. The following section provides definitional 
clarity of the main threat based strategies; deterrence, compellence, blackmail and coercive 
diplomacy.   
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Deterrence is the main security strategy for most states. It is a defensive strategy where the 
rationale is for a state or alliance to have enough military power to make a threat of retaliation 
credible. It’s a structural form of power to deter any attempts to alter status quo, and “as any 
Marxist will point out; structural power is more important than individual agency, since the 
latter is dependent on the former”(Matlary2012:127).Deterrence is passive in nature; the 
objective is to discourage action, based on fear of consequences. A deterrent threat draws a 
red line and warns the target not to cross it(Secsher&Fuhrmann2017:27). The consequences 
of certain actions should be clearly stated to avoid misunderstandings, temptations or hubris 
by an adversary to test validity of the threat.  
The efficiency of deterrence like coercion hinges on the credibility of the threat of reaction 
and the credibility of a threat is based on ability and will to use force. It’s the credibility of the 
armed reaction that dissuades the adversary from crossing the line. The advent of nuclear 
weapons changed the consequences of crossing that line, from a potential threat of war to total 
destruction. There was never any doubt of the ability to use force, but nuclear weapons 
changed the perception of will. The chances of open war between two nuclear powers are 
hard to imagine so the nuclear potential for destruction creates stability, but it’s a risk too 
much stability recreates danger because for the nuclear weapons to have any effect on the 
adversary, the possibility of its use have to be real. That’s why the m.a.d. doctrine was 
replaced with gradual response. The credibility of m.a.d. was unbelievable. A massive 
retaliation for a possible minor violation with the prospect of potential great losses for the 
deterring nation and the harm it would inflict on itself by escalating the conflict made the 
threat improbable.   
Despite the active and passive nature of deterrence and compellence it’s sometimes difficult 
to distinguish between them; “since any deterrent threat can be stated in compellent terms, 
and vice versa. Reversing a completed action versus deterring a future planned action is rarely 
a clear-cut division”(Byman&Waxman2002:7). Consequently, the lines between the strategies 
can be blurred; if both sides are capable to hurt, but not accomplish its goals, what’s deemed 
deterrent and what’s coercion would change in the dynamic interaction; “if B starts doing 
something that A has urged it not to do in the first place and the situation has to be retrieved 
would the difference be blurry”(Freedman&Raghavan2013:208). The two strategies are 
connected in the sense that a failed coercion attempt or deterrent red line influences the 
reputation of the actors, and the ability for future coercion or deterrence against adversaries.  
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Compellence “involves initiating action to get the opponent to do or stop doing something he 
would prefer not to”(George1993:6). It covers both coercive diplomacy and blackmail; 
coercive diplomacy “attempts to reverse an action that has already occurred or otherwise 
overturn the status quo, such as evicting an aggressor from territory or halt the development 
of a nuclear program”(Byman&Waxman2002:7), while “blackmail is characterized by being 
a more offensive strategy aiming at making a target to do something it otherwise wouldn’t 
prefer to do”(George1993:6). Blackmail gains or cause losses towards the adversary if not 
certain demands are met: “either you pay this amount of money or we will kill your captured 
soldiers”. It carries with it the negative connotations from its everyday use, from hostage 
situations, and is often perceived as a strategy for the weak and desperate (i.e. terror 
organizations kidnapping civilians), indicating illegitimacy, but can be used between states 
too. Sechser &Fuhrmann describes blackmail as a threat of punishment, used when you can’t 
fix the problem yourself, so you threaten punishment in order to persuade someone to give it 
to you(Sechser&Furhmann2017:25). A scenario can be the Chinese Government threatening 
the Norwegian government to ruin the political and economic relationship if the Noble Peace 
Prize is awarded to a Chinese dissident. The Chinese government does not have any direct 
influence on the Noble committee, but can expect the Norwegian Government to have some 
leverage and use blackmail threats by proxy to get the “right” decision. Essentially taking 
salmon export as hostage to blackmailing the host country of the prize. A more extreme 
scenario is individual threats against the committee members or families; “your daughter is in 
danger if the prize goes to a dissident”.  Blackmail and coercive diplomacy strategies are 
problematic from a legal point of view, unless its justified on self- defense grounds.  
Coercive Diplomacy is in Ilario Schettino’s words “one of the most intriguing and common 
practices of conducting inter-state relations and embodies the essence of the art of diplomacy 
achieving political objectives and fostering a state’s national interest without waging war” 
(Schettino:1). Coercive Diplomacy “seeks persuade the opponent to cease aggression rather 
than bludgeon him into stopping, with use of threats and/ or limited use of force as means of 
persuasion (Craig &George1995:196). There is two demands that can be made on the 
adversary: to stop what he is doing, or undo what he has done- that is to reverse what he has 
managed to accomplish”(George1993:6). The action of the initiating state will stop or not be 
carried out, if the target does comply. The first mover action is in the initiating state’s hands, 
and not in the targets, but the target has to decide if its behavior should be changed based on 
the action or threat of action taken by the initiating state. The first ask for less than the latter 
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and could be easier to accomplish, but as we will see in the empirical cases, the US succeeded 
in stopping and undoing Gadhafi’s nuclear program in 2003, but was not able to stop 
Gadhafi’s violence towards rebels/ civilians in 2011 based on threats and limited use of force. 
Coercive diplomacy is in a sense an oxymoron because diplomacy is traditionally regarded as 
a peaceful way to settle disagreements between two states through bargaining, the very 
opposite of using military force and war (Hauge&Neumann2011:51). The resort to war or use 
of force is exactly what’s deemed failed diplomacy, since diplomacy seeks a positive sum 
approach, which ensures that both parties are better off than the alternative, brute force with a 
winner taking all. Nevertheless, coercive diplomacy is also founded on some common interest 
of gains, or avoidance of mutual damage, as Schelling notes; “an awareness of the need to 
make the other party prefer an outcome acceptable to oneself “(Schelling2008:1). Diplomatic 
bargaining consists of threats and offers, and trust and distrust, but the end goal is a peaceful 
outcome, beneficial enough to both sides, so the more destructive alternative is avoided. It’s 
the active threat of this destruction, captured in the phrase “putting all options on the table”, 
the will and ability to hurt that makes coercive diplomacy, efficient and risky. The threats of 
use of force can make diplomatic negotiations and a state’s demands easier to obtain given the 
higher stake if it fails. 
Coercive diplomacy can despite having “diplomacy” in its name (which by definition is the 
practice of conducting negotiations between representatives of states) also includes non-state 
actors. This is empirically grounded and useful because states increasingly have to deal with 
non- state actors in the realm of security politics. Still, it’s not a diplomatic exchange when 
one part does not have the legal status as a sovereign state with control over a legal territory. 
The adversary’s lack of sovereignty and legitimacy, both in the eyes of the domestic audience 
and international law influences the strategic calculations for a coercer, but this thesis analyze 
coercive diplomacy attempts between two or more sovereign states, although the support of 
the rebels in the humanitarian case provide some of the same dilemmas revolving non- state 
actors. 
2.2 Strategic Context 
The end of the Cold War left the U.S. unrivaled as the sole superpower in the world. The new 
security environment demanded a reevaluation of the core national interest and identifications 
of threats, dangers and responsibilities. The U.S. needed to redefine its role and decide which 
military engagements it wanted to uphold and develop. However, the lack of external enemies 
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pushed the state security perspective in the background for western decision-makers and 
scholars for about 20 years (1990-2010). The period brought a greater focus on human 
security and protection of individuals materialized in several humanitarian interventions, but 
there was clearly no consensus or consistency in the use of force the first part of the post- 
Cold War period. One analyst counted “21 U.S. military deployments between 1990 and 2001 
for reasons as different as evacuating American citizens, fostering political stability, 
humanitarian missions and conventional war”(Fischer2012:135), in addition to stopping 
terrorism and nuclear proliferation. Art finds several factors accounting for the increased use 
of military force; no other superpower constrained it, previously suppressed regional conflicts 
turned hot and the U.S. found it to be in its national interest to uphold status quo, other softer 
foreign policy tools did not work, the U.S. was the only power with global reach and was 
asked to help solve problems, and lastly threats and challenges to core national interests made 
use of force necessary(Art2003:5). The last point is not least connected to the non- 
proliferation efforts as presented in this thesis. 
Bush Administration: Another momentous change in the security context came with the 
9/11 terrorist attacks. It gave a clearer sense of purpose in the national security policies and 
elevated terrorism from a crime to a national security threat and war crime. The terrorist 
attack on the World Trade Center, 9/11, 2001 started the so-called “War on Terror”. This 
development influenced how scholars and policymakers interpreted security politics. The 
globally networked, non-state actors, raised questions about the state-centric and rationality 
assumptions underpinning traditional thought (Buzan&Hansen2009: 229). In the real world 
the Bush administration reflected this in the reversal of its initial security policy with focus on 
“national interest and overwhelming military strength”( Ficher2012:139) to state- building 
and anti- terror fighting in faraway lands, and invoked the right to self-defense under 
international law. President Bush outlined his National Security Strategy (NSS) in 2002 and 
reiterated in 2006 where he declared “the US would make no distinction between terrorists 
and those who knowingly harbor or provide aid to them”(Ficher2012:139). Bush continued by 
emphasize an increased effort to prevent nuclear proliferation and stated “America will act 
against such emerging threats before they are fully formed”(Ficher2012:139; NSS:2002). The 
new NSS thus opened up for so called “preemptive strikes” not only on imminent threats, but 
to forestall long-term threats before adversaries had developed the capability to launch an 
attack on the U.S.(Ficher2012:139).  It was a move away from containment doctrine in large 
part founded on deterrence, “if you move forward you’ll trigger a reaction” to “preemption” 
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to prevent threats from developing in the first place(Ficher2012:139) Coercive diplomacy is a 
useful tool for preemptive purposes, since it seeks undo or stop (preempt) unwanted behavior, 
and rain in the benefits from war, without having to wage it. The security environment post- 
9/11 gave bipartisan support for Bush’s new polices; Congress allowed him to ‘use all 
necessary means’ against nations, organizations or individuals committing or aiding 
terror(Ficher2008:141). “The rally-round-the-flag effect” would last beyond the first Libyan 
case, but be significantly reduced in the second, when war fatigue in the American 
population, and questions about the effectiveness and results of the preemptive doctrine and  
military adventures made president Obama more cautious about using military force abroad.   
Obama Administration: The Obamas Administration’s National Security Strategy from 
2010 was in the words of his UN Ambassador Susan Rice “a rather dramatic departure from 
the most recent prior national security strategy”(Sanger&Baker2010) and moved away from 
the “War on Terror” by demoting the terror threat to one of many security threats. The NSS 
2010 emphasized multilateralism “by seeking broad international support, working with 
institutions such as NATO and the U.N. Security Council”, but noted that “the U.S. reserve 
the right to act unilaterally if necessary”(NSS2010:22). The NSS 2010 did not mention 
preemptive strikes and showed a more general reluctance to use of military force, expressed 
by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton; “we are shifting from mostly direct application and 
exercise of American power to one of indirection, that requires patience and partners and get 
results more slowly”(Sanger&Baker2010). The NSS expressed expectations for rising powers 
to take greater responsibility of international obligations (NSS2010:13) and acknowledged the 
ongoing power shift to Asia by stating the U.S. is “monitoring Chinas military modernization 
program, and prepare accordingly, so the country and its allies won’t be affected 
negatively(NSS2010:43). The broader systemic change fostered a “pivot” to Asia, but “it’s 
hard to find many metrics supporting this effort, the distractions from the Middle East and the 
laws of economic gravity is hard to deny” (Allison2017:8). China’s recent growth is the prime 
example of the power shift, surpassing the US on most manufactural, consumer and economic 
indicators like PPP (purchasing power parity)(Allison2017:10), creating alternative economic 
institutions (AIIB), and translating the growth into military might with a budget second only 
to the US(Allison2017:20). We are therefore returning to elements of the old great power 
balance system, where great powers negotiate a stable order based on mutual interests and 
balance of power. Russia is rearming and using military power in the near abroad (Georgia 
and Ukraine), China claiming a regional “sphere of influence” in the South China Sea and 
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projects power globally as an alternative to the West. The second Libyan case was in this 
context another distraction from this more pressing national security interests, and avoiding 
entanglement of military and economic resources in region became an important objective in 
itself, as the “Pax Americana” seems to be ending (the international order that has been 
founded on U.S economic and military dominance and ideological appeal). The American 
willingness and ability to do the heavy lifting and exercise leadership around the world is 
declining and forces Europe to end its strategic holiday. 
Europe experienced a long and deep peace with ever greater economic and political 
integration in the EU after 1990. Russia, the traditional main security scare, was temporary 
weakened and preoccupied with its own problems. However, the Georgian war in 2008 
signaled renewed Russian strength and willingness to use force, and although the country 
long-term power forecast is of relative decline, it exposed the European unpreparedness to 
counter military force. The post- modern European “security community” is an exception in 
the world of modern states, and while Europe promoted soft-power, “cut defense budgets, and 
demanded that use of force should be used as a “force for good”(Matlary2016:41), other 
powers awakened. This has left Europe according to Michita; “unable to act strategically 
because they would not take military force seriously, and ‘take comfort in postmodern 
language, with inactivity substituting for strategic foresight’”(Matlary2016:41; Michita2014). 
Michta advice Europe to reconsider the historic reluctance to use military 
force”(Michta2017). The fact is that the U.S risks being economically and militarily 
overstretched necessitating tougher priorities and greater burden sharing from European 
partners, for too long being comfortable buck passing. The American arm-twisting to trigger a 
potent European response to Russian aggression in Ukraine and the dynamic in the 
humanitarian coercion case is in this perspective a taste of what to come in the future.  
The Paradox of Legality: The returning great-power players do not have the same legal 
constraints on the use of force as the West. The U.S. has always been willing and able to use 
military force without Security Council approval, still the western focus on legality; a UN 
mandate and regional support in the humanitarian coercion case undermined the coercive 
diplomacy attempt. The credibility and the effectiveness of the threat are reduced when made 
conditional on international law. The paradox is to efficiently enforce international law it 
might be necessary to break the same law. The dilemma is stemming from the contradictory 
principles of sovereignty and human rights, the latter the condition for the doctrine of 
“responsibility to protect”(R2P). Sovereignty is undivided among states- there is in principle 
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no difference between large and small states, but it’s also predicated on universal human 
rights, which make sovereignty conditional on the respect for human rights(Matlary2016:55). 
The R2P doctrine emphasize that it’s each nation state’s responsibility to protect its own 
citizen, but if it’s unwilling or unable to do so, “the principle of non- intervention yields to the 
international responsibility to protect” (Luck2006:85). The UN member states has to be 
prepared helping a state meeting its obligations to protect its people by responding in a timely 
and decisive manner through the Security Council (Luck2006:5). 
The Western states supports and want to use force to uphold a UN- based world order, but the 
condition of legality is problematic for two reasons: it gives a veto to great powers in when 
and how to intervene and it undermines the threats of force and the efficiency of use of force.   
Humanitarian coercion or intervention will in principle break the sovereignty norm while it’s 
enforcing the human rights norm. The legality of a humanitarian coercion attempt hinges on 
Security Council approval, and makes the second norm conditional on great power approval 
or abstention from a veto in reality a victim of realpolitik, if a great power disapproves of 
intervention, it won’t pass the Council. This is the reason why some criticize human security 
as just a smokescreen for state interests and that R2P or ICC is coopted to serve the great 
powers. The invocation of R2P principle in the Libyan case made it possible to protect human 
rights, but it rested on the aforementioned principle of contingent sovereignty, that had to be 
justified by claims falling into one of four categories; genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing 
and crimes against humanity”(Gazzini2011:7). The latter was the only viable option, but to 
reach this conclusion it required a referral from the Security Council to the ICC, which lead 
its chief prosecutor Ocampo to conclude there was reasonable basis for the 
claim(Gazzini2011:8). The recognition of the NTC came with the same reasoning, Gadhafi 
lost his sovereignty rights, as the legitimate ruler of the country, because he failed to protect 
his people and guarantee human rights(Gazzini2011:7). It was at the same time, necessary for 
the credibility of the threat of use of force, as long as the threat was conditioned, or at least 
not expected to be executed without approval the Security Council or regional support. The 
legality worry has generally been less prevalent in US foreign policy.  
2.3 Libya-U.S relations: From Foe to Friend and Back Again: 
The relationship between the U.S. and Libya were hostile in the two decades leading up to the 
successful coercion attempt. The U.S. were concerned about Libyan radicalism translated in 
support for “terrorism, foreign policy adventurism (meddling in African countries), pursuit of 
weapons of mass destruction, and opposition to the Middle East peace 
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process”(O’Sullivan2003:173), while Libya on their side objected to what they saw as 
American imperialism and support for Israel. The peculiar Libyan foreign policy objectives 
resulted in support for terror attacks against American and Western civilian targets and the 
creation of a WMD program. The U.S. foreign policy towards Libya relied on “a sporadic 
coercive campaign under Reagan”(George1993:53), and implementation of unilateral and 
multilateral sanctions to isolate the regime to spur behavioral change. The shrewd multilateral 
sanctions led to Libyan concessions by “giving up terror suspects for trial, reduced support for 
terrorism and a softer stance on Israel (reducing support for the Palestinian authorities and 
advising Arafat not to claim statehood in 2000). These concessions made some western 
countries to push for reintegration of Libya into the global polity and economy to consolidate 
the positive changes” (O’Sullivan2003:185). It was met with skepticism in Washington, but 
the events of 9/11 changed the security context, and the War on Terror became Washington’s 
number one priority. Gadhafi used the opportunity skillfully by condemning the attacks and 
offer of condolences. Still the WMD issue remained a flashpoint between the two countries. 
The American attack on Taliban in Afghanistan showed a willingness to use force to punish 
American adversaries and achieve foreign and security policy goals by use of force. The 
attack on Saddam Hussein confirmed the American resolve and the Bush Administrations 
eagerness to follow up its NSS 2002 impacted Gadhafi’s security calculations. The 
combination of inducements and assurances made Gadhafi comply with US demands and 
changed his polices on nuclear proliferation and terrorism.  
A post- WMD Libya saw gradually improving relationship with Europe and the US. The 
country was removed from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism and Gadhafi visited 
European capitals and signed business deals(Chivvis2014:23). He even sponsored peace 
initiatives including for the Darfur region in South Sudan(Kuperman2013:132) Diplomatic 
normalization followed, seeing the US installing a new ambassador in 2009. Libya stayed out 
of the international spotlight in the years between the nuclear deal and the Arab spring 
uprisings. The first protests against the regime started on January 17, 2011 and quickly 
escalated, as it had in the neighbor countries, to mass protests. The rebellion were fueled by a 
mix of “discontent with authoritarianism, and more structural societal reasons like corruption, 
inequality, unemployment, lack of housing, and a new media like Al 
Jazeera”(Chivvis2014:25). Gadhafi’s words and actions made him a pariah again, and a rapid 
process, saw two UN Resolutions, lots of warnings and threats from Western and regional 
leaders, before military action was implemented. The conflict dragged on for some months 
25 
 
before his death was confirmed in October 2011. The U.S. sentiments were expressed in the 























3. Methodological Approach  
This chapter outlines the epistemological, ontological and methodological foundations for the 
research. The specific method and research design in use and the process of how the data has 
been gathered and analyzed. The purpose of this endeavor is to give a clear and concise 
understanding of the research undertaken, so in the best of the naturalist tradition, any 
scientist doing the same research under the same conditions is able to verify of falsify the 
previous findings.  
3.1 Assumptions 
The ontological assumption of the research builds on the notion that there is a real world out 
there, which exist independent from our senses whether we observe it or 
not(Moses&Knutsen2012:49).  Epistemology is essentially the question of “what is 
knowledge”. In the naturalist sense, knowledge is about this world and the regularities of 
nature acquired through “systematic observations of associated phenomena” 
(Moses&Knutsen2012:49). We can identify these associations or variable correlations 
through our senses and formulate them as “natural laws” which can be empirically tested. The 
method of choice determines how to uncover and possibly find the strength of the causal 
mechanisms. Bennett and George defines causal mechanisms rather dryly as “unobservable 
physical, social, or psychological processes through which agents with causal capacities 
operate, but only in specific contexts or conditions to transfer energy, information or matter to 
other entities”(George&Bennett2005:137). It in other words, a process creates an outcome, 
and social science seeks to explain the causes that brought this specific outcome by 
formulating hypothesis and theories for empirical testing. Over time the accumulation of 
confirmed correlations and theories grows and provide time tested knowledge about how the 
social world works.  
“The infernal challenge is to isolate one causal mechanism from another, and identify under 
which condition a particular mechanism become activated”(Geeorge&Bennett2005:137). In 
an ideal experimental setting, the causal mechanisms is found by isolating all other potential 
known factors, but normally within social science, such settings are not viable, so we have to 
find causality or correlations by other means. This research builds on hypothesis testing of 
established theory and cumulated knowledge materialized in the ideal policy conceptual 
framework. The qualitative approach makes identification of causal mechanism difficult, but 
the empirical testing of the minimum requirements for success provides useful information 
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and explanation coercive diplomacy outcomes. The “structured, focused comparison method” 
allow for a thoroughly comparative analysis and identification of similarities and differences 
between the two cases. The next sections will place the method within the naturalist 
hierarchy, explain the choice of method for this research and elaborate on the logic beneath it. 
3.2 Choosing Method 
Moses & Knutsen characterizes “methods as tools while methodologies are well- equipped 
toolboxes”(Moses&Knutsen2012:3). A method is the research technique or procedure used to 
answer the research question. The choice of method is based on the ontological and 
epistemological assumptions and how to best explain the phenomena of interest. Social 
phenomena often have several mechanism influencing and outcome, but the ambition of 
naturalist social science is to discover these causes. In our case, the ideal policy holds that 
both coercion and inducements and assurances influence the outcome, the relative weight of 
each is harder to distinguish, so the aim is just to test if these mechanisms have to be present 
for a positive outcome to occur. 
This research builds on a naturalist assumption and relates to the naturalist hierarchy of 
methods. . It ranks the different methods based on its ability to control and order causal and 
temporal relationships (Moses&Knutsen2012:50). Naturalists rank the experiment as the best 
method because it enables us to expose one of the variables (or groups) for stimulus and hold 
everything else constant and then decide whether it affected the outcome or not. There are 
strict procedures of how to select the cases or divide population into groups because a 
difference in the groups at the outset can influence the outcome. The experiment does have 
grave practical and ethical limitations within social science. Imagine when the research 
question is the efficiency of use of threats or limited use of force on a state level. Just the 
thought of staging an experiment, risking the outbreak of a war for scientific purposes, would 
be impossible.  
The statistical method deemed number two in the hierarchy is a useful alternative and the 
highest regarded of the three non- experimental methods. It can control for all the key known 
variables because it makes it possible to do a systematic control by partial correlations. It is 
not possible to use statistical analysis with a few cases and some phenomena will have 
qualitative features difficult to operationalize and measure in quantitative terms. The 
statistical method could have been useful in this research if time and resources had made it 
possible to map all the coercive attempts pursued by the United States after the Cold War. 
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The operationalization could have been practical possible, but it would be challenging to 
make the coercive attempts fit into the narrow categories of the quantitative data set, a lot of 
the definitions of the concepts and the decisions of whether a phenomenon is present or not, 
makes it challenging to code and make them fit into a crude variables. This becomes even 
more challenging when investigating certain types of coercive attempts, such as nuclear 
proliferation cases, because the number of potential cases would be smaller. This analysis 
consists of one nuclear proliferation case and one humanitarian intervention case, with the 
same coercion target (Libya) and two types of coercers, the US alone and with allies.   
Arend Lijphart recommends the comparative method as a good alternative under 
circumstances “when the number of cases available for analysis is so small that cross 
tabulating them further in order to establish credible controls is not feasible” 
(Lijphart1971:684). The comparative method thus become an imperfect substitute for the 
experimental method, but can still give us valuable insight into the causes behind the 
phenomenon we are studying. The comparative research design allows us to test cases in their 
natural environment and allows us to test hypothesized relationships between variables, by 
selecting cases to maximize the variance of the independent variables and similarly minimize 
the variance of the control variable. Lijphart advice this method as a preferable option to case 
studies because of its explanatory range. Nevertheless, this research utilizes the case study 
method because it is best suited to combine in-depth analysis with the testing of the 
conceptual framework.  
Case studies approaches includes the “structured, focused, comparison method” and builds on 
the same epistemological foundation about what knowledge is, but differs in the 
methodological logic because it doesn’t share the same “reasoning regarding issues like case 
selection, operationalization of variables, and use of inductive and deductive 
logic”(George&Bennett2005:6). Case studies is so- called small-N studies with fewer cases at 
hand, as noted earlier Lijphart saw them as inferior to large-N studies, and advice their use 
only when – large-N studies was not possible. George and Bennett describe a case as “an 
instance of a class of events which refers to a phenomenon of scientific interest”, like 
effectiveness of coercive diplomacy attempts, “that the investigator choose to study with the 
aim of developing theory regarding causes of similarities or differences among cases of that 
class of events”(George&Bennet2005:17/18). Bennett and George use “the Cuban Missile 
Crisis” as an example which can represent several different classes of historical events, 
“deterrence, coercive diplomacy, crisis management etc.”, but where the analysts choose 
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which episode or part of the event to investigate. This is worth keeping in mind, looking at the 
second case where some might claim it was a “humanitarian intervention and not “coercion” 
case. The fact is that the case involved use of coercion both threats and use of force and 
looking at it from a coercive diplomacy perspective can provide explanations for why the 
threats and use force failed to alter Gadhafi’s behavior. That is not to say that it also covered 
the concept of humanitarian intervention and probably other classes of historical events. 
Moreover, Bennett and George don’t see comparative method as distinct from case studies, 
and define case study to include both within- case analysis of single cases and comparison of 
a small number of cases, since the inference is stronger when we use both within- case 
analysis and cross case comparison within a single study”(George&Benneett2005:18). This 
argument underlies the use of the “structured, focused comparison” analysis of the two 
coercive diplomacy attempts in this thesis.        
3.3. The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison 
The method of structured, focused comparison refers to a “general method of theory 
development in qualitative, small- N research”(Mahoney2004:1099). The method is 
“focused” in the sense that the research is done with a specific research objective in mind and 
a theoretical focus for that objective (George&Bennett2004:70). It is “structured” because it 
employs general questions to guide the data collection and analysis in the historical 
cases(Mahoney2004:1099). The general questions guiding this research collection is the 
synthesized coercion theories of George and Schelling, expressed in Jakobsen’s ideal policy. 
The general questions in this case are therefore the minimum conditions for success in the 
ideal policy framework, used to analyze observations relevant for the operationalized 
variables derived from the ideal policy. The focus in the data gathering of the two Libyan 
historical cases is on the coercive diplomacy element of the event. The abstract and specific 
nature of the research makes it easier to pursue an unbiased comparative analysis, by not 
looking at the cases holistically, but only at the same narrow aspects of the phenomenon. The 
downside is a cruder analysis that deals selectively with certain aspect of cases, leaving 
possible relevant information out. 
According to Mahoney the “conceptualization has to be at a high enough level of abstraction 
to be measured systematically across different cases”(Mahoney2004:1099), to avoid only 
singular case, context- dependent questions. The ideal policy framework has accounted for 
this problem by depending on rationality assumption and the ability to hurt over 
understanding in formulating the minimum conditions for success and by operationalize the 
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ambiguous definition of “limited force”. In addition, by using single cases in theory- testing 
we assess the validity and scope of the conditions in the conceptual framework. It is important 
in theory- testing to identify whether the test cases (the Libyan cases in our research), are 
“most-likely”, “least-likely”, or “crucial” for the theory. Testing can also be used to identify 
the scope of conditions of the theory- under which conditions they are most- and least likely 
to apply (Geoge&Bennett201:75) the latter point is examined with inclusion of strategic 
context in the analysis.  
3.4 Strengths and Weaknesses  
Small- N – case study methods have some inherent strengths and weaknesses. One of the 
strengths is conceptual validity since case studies allow “for conceptual refinements with 
higher level of validity over a smaller number of cases”(George&Bennett2005:18). It is also a 
starting point for theoretical development in heuristic identification of new variables and 
hypothesis through study of deviant or outlier cases(Goerge&Bennett2005:19), so if the ideal 
policy fail to predict an outcome, the information obtain can be utilize in theory refinement. 
Case studies can also examine explanatory factors in detail by looking at many variables and 
identify which one is present or not in a given case(George&Bennett2005:21).  
Case studies allow us to choose cases based on the dependent variable. In this research, cases 
are chosen because they consisted of the phenomenon of interest; coercive diplomacy, to see 
if the conceptual framework would hold up against new empirical evidence. This made it 
possible to identify if the minimum conditions in the theory were present or absent in a given 
outcome. The inherent limitations in the method is the inability to give us information about 
the frequency or representativeness of a case, and a weak ability capability to estimate the 
average causal effect of variables in the sample(George&Bennett2005:222). The use of two 
single cases in theory testing limits the representativeness of the study, but the fact that the 
conceptual framework has a good empirical track- record make this research one of many 
contributions adding to the cumulative knowledge of coercive diplomacy. However, 
measuring causal effect beyond that a set of condition is expected to be present for success is 
not within the scope of this research. Case studies always has a problem with the trade- off 
between parsimony and richness  the tension between high validity and good historical 
explanation in particular case and generalization beyond that single 
case(Geoerge&Bennett2005:22). This is accounted for by the ideal policy framework because 
of its intent on providing explanations with as few explanatory factors as possible, and also 
accounted for in the comparative analysis because of its selective focus on certain aspects of 
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the phenomenon. It sacrifices details and context dependency to achieve cross- case 
generalization. 
3.5 Research Design  
The research design is the logical structure of the research inquiry and the plan used to answer 
the research question (Burnham et al.2004: 30). It gives a framework to work within and 
guides the choice of method. The fundamental question is always: Which research method 
will provide the best answer to research question? And test of the hypothesis? (Burnham et 
al.2004:31). The aim of this thesis is twofold: 1) pursue theory- development and testing of 
the conceptualized ideal policy framework 2) Make a comparative analysis of the two 
empirical cases based on the structured, focused comparison method. 
The general, abstract coercive diplomacy theory and past empirical data is conceptualized into 
the ideal policy framework subjected to testing by two recent coercive diplomacy attempts. 
The theory- development part of the thesis consists of an amendment and refinement to the 
ideal policy framework. The theory- testing is utilized by formulating two hypotheses; 
predicating the minimum conditions for success outlined in the ideal policy framework has to 
be present for coercive diplomacy success, and absent for failure. The conditions in the ideal 
policy framework also inform the comparative analysis of the two Libyan cases. The 
“structured, focused, comparison” method allows for only looking at the relevant aspect of the 
phenomenon. In this case the four ideal policy conditions is the basis for the data gathering.  It 
makes it possible to validate or falsify the theory and to make an in depth comparative 
analysis. The way the data is gathered, by only looking at the same aspects in both the 
coercive diplomacy cases, allows for a thorough comparative analysis identifying similarities 
and differences and possible explanations for potential different outcomes. The research is not 
looking at the cases holistically, and getting the whole picture, or looking for other possible 
explanations. The fact that we are testing two cases, can expand the reach of the findings, and 
have (limited) implications beyond the particular case.  
3.6 Collecting Data 
The data collection is based on a literature review of already published material on the 
selected Libyan cases and coercion theory. The empirical research is informed by the 
theoretical conditions as guided by the structured, focused comparison method. Neither data 
for an experimental research (impossible) nor statistical analysis (would be more a 
dissertation task, too little time and resources available) was possible to collect. 
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Libyan primary sources have been inaccessible since field studies and interviews with people 
on the ground or with central decision makers in the country was not a possible option. The 
security situation in Libya has steadily deteriorated after Gadhafi’s fall, and the current 
government power does reach all of the Libyan territory. The main adversary, Colonel 
Gadhafi is dead, and language barriers and lack of financial resources would make it difficult 
to get in touch with people from his inner circle. Although, some of the sources includes 
interviews with informants from Gadhafi’s regimes (Braut- Hegghammer:2009/ 2016). The 
historical events are still too narrow in time to include declassified sources, so perhaps future 
declassification will provide different or additional motives for the intervention. That is a task 
for future historians.  
The opinions and calculations made by American political actors are somewhat easier to 
obtain. Many was expressed in real time in the news media, some have published memoirs 
and given interviews in retrospect, and the information has been analyzed and interpreted by 
academic scholars and researchers. I could have reached out to some of these leading scholars 
internationally and nationally, but I felt the material I got from databases with academic 
journals, media and good old-fashioned books in the library sufficed to inform the cases. Both 
cases have already built up a rich and divergent academic literature, so I got opposing and 
critical views on the issues.  
Coercive diplomacy theory development has been ongoing since the 1960s, to a varying 
degree of intensity, but there has been established a considerable amount of literature to 
review within the two theoretical schools of Schelling and George. Jakobsen’s ideal policy 
framework builds on this extensive data collection. The utilization of his framework with one 
tweak makes the basis for this research’s theory testing, time-tested and well-grounded in 
both a theoretical and empirical sense.  
3.7 Reliability, Validity and Generalizability  
Strict norms and procedures for reliability and validity of a research is a cornerstone of social 
science. Reliability ensures that the scientific research is credible and repeatable, so another 
researcher conducting the same research is able to get the same results. Therefore, any 
academic researcher has to be clear about his assumptions, definitions and use of sources. 
This research builds on document study of open sources, so if another researcher would like 
to replicate this study, it is accessible through databases and online searches. Foreign policy 
research can sometimes be difficult to replicate because it can build on anonymous interviews 
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from high-level officials or classified material. The researcher should in those instances be 
open about the nature of the sources, and explain for the reader why and what implications of 
the sources had on his findings. There are some that questions the viability of replicating 
qualitative studies and the neutrality of the scientist. The theory testing in the thesis would be 
easier to replicate than the comparative analysis because it is conditioned on a stricter form of 
scientific inquiry. The theoretical conditions are clearly formulated and the empirical 
observations are gathered accordingly. The comparative analysis has a wider range, although 
it’s anchored to the same theoretical conditions, it involves a greater element of interpretation 
and arguments because it deals with motives and intentions, so the replicability would be 
more challenging than for the theory- testing. 
Validity refers to the credibility of the interpretations and results of the scientific findings.   
Whether the process and results meets scientific standards both internally and externally; 
internal validity means that the researcher controls the accuracy of the findings by employing 
certain procedures so the research findings correspond with reality i.e. that the ideal policy 
test is measuring what it’s supposed to do (the explanatory range of the ideal policy 
framework). If, we have empirical basis to claim that the ideal policy conditions are present 
and therefore predicts or explain a coercive outcome. Therefore the internal validity deals 
with how the research is structured, if the research design is suitable to answer to the research 
questions, and that the research is building on existing science and theory and the data is 
gathered from reliable sources. It’s important to be critical and transparent about the research 
process and the researcher should be open about the assumptions and reasoning of the 
findings and the analysis.  
The external validity deals with the replicability and environment surrounding the research, so 
the research can be generalized beyond the single case. Generalization of qualitative research 
is generally limited, and this research is no exception, although it portends to have cross case 
explanative value, so the ideal policy can be utilized on other coercive diplomacy cases too. 
The fact that this research builds on a rationality assumption rather than being context- 
dependent, makes it more ambitious than a regular case study. The hope is that the amended 
ideal policy framework is continuously empirically tested on new cases to see if it holds up 





In order to understand the logic behind coercive diplomacy an analysis of the theoretical 
contributions by the pioneers Schelling and George is a good starting point. Their landmark 
studies; “Arms and Influence”(Schelling, 1966), “Limits to Coercive Diplomacy: Laos, Cuba, 
Vietnam” (George et al.1971) and later “Forceful Persuasion- Coercive Diplomacy as an 
alternative to War”(George1993) are the basis for the two dominant and diverging schools of 
theory- building within the field. These contributions serve as the general theoretical 
framework for coercive diplomacy, used by scholars to operationalize variables into testable 
conceptual frameworks.  
The operationalization effort has not been easy for different reasons; Schelling’s theoretical 
insights were very abstract and more concerned with the general logic of compellence than 
the real world. He gives no advice of how to translate it into operational variables, and even 
failed trying himself. His work provides greater understanding and logically consistent ideas 
cutting through the complexities of the empirical world(Jordan2015:6), but the lack of context 
dependent variables reduces its value for theory- building. George built his theory bottom- up 
and argued the general theory could not provide insight and explanation for conditions 
necessary for success in a given case. “The conditions causing coercive diplomacy to succeed 
or fail were highly context dependent and too complex to be captured by abstract theorizing” 
(Jakobsen2011:157). This challenge to formulate a theory as “a generalized statement about 
coercive diplomacy that seeks to go beyond a simple description of a single event to a higher 
level of analysis (Churton&Brown2010:4) made Petter Viggo Jakobsen synthesize the general 
abstract theory into an “ideal policy” framework consisting of four minimum conditions for 
coercive diplomacy success, outlined in the end of the chapter and utilized for theory- testing 
in this thesis.  
“The purpose of gaining insight into the explanatory power of a theory is to be able to predict 
future patterns and influence policies that might effectuate beneficial changes to these 
patterns”(Churton&Brown:2010:4). This systematically approach is what makes political 
science a science, because it offers ordered knowledge based on systematic inquiry 
(Stoker&March2002:11). Empirical testing of established or proposed theories is central to 
this aim, especially for the ones adhering to positivist or rationalist approach where “theory 
and aggregated knowledge is amassed and refined by empirical testing no matter if 
foundations for the theoretical propositions or hypothesis builds on deductive or inductive 
reasoning”(Jakobsen2011:15).  The purpose of the ideal policy is thus to identify minimum 
36 
 
conditions for success that can be validated or falsified by rigorous empirical testing. The 
ideal policy is constructed to “determine the probability of coercive diplomacy success in a 
given crisis or explain coercive diplomacy outcomes post hoc with as few explanatory factors 
as possible”(Jakobsen2016:284/285). The next section outlines the nature of coercion, 
Schelling’s logically deduced theoretical insights, George’s “general characteristics of 
coercive diplomacy and the logic on which its presumed efficacy rests”(George1993:3) and 
additional aspects of coercive diplomacy theory.  
4.1 The Nature of Coercion: James Cable (1985) wrote strikingly about how coercion is 
implicit in most aspects of international relations and human relationships, be it in the family 
between parents and kids, at work between employer and employees, in the welfare state 
between officials and recipients, or in international diplomacy between states like great 
powers and small states. The communication between the two parties can be cordial, but the 
assumption is clear; some people or states are entitled to expect compliance(Cable1985:1). 
Coercion is part of any relationship and it’s founded on power asymmetry, usually the weaker 
part will comply automatically, as the coercive aspect of the relation is internalized or 
institutionalized, but sometimes “it will be put to test to either expose it as a bluff or to reach 
a compromise”(Cable1985:1). One important difference distinguishes coercion at a personal 
and state level. Individuals are guarded by the law, or part of a system (authoritarian states) 
that has some form of rules and tradition to guide behavior.  The anarchical nature of 
international relations makes coercion less constrained and although violence is not a 
necessary feature of coercion the possibility of violence is and force can be threatened in 
many ways; warships can easily be deployed in international waters, and pose and maintain a 
threat without commitment, and if need be withdraw as quietly as they 
came”(Cable1985:2/3). Ultimately it’s the possibility of violence, combined with other 
measures that the makes the adversary calculate compliance is favorable to non- compliance.   
The coercive aspect needs to be expressed as threats: A threat is about communication. A 
threat is most efficient and risky when stated publicly and explicitly, but can also be conveyed 
implicitly or veiled by words and actions. The target of a coercive threat has to be aware of 
the threat to be able to act on it. It has to know what it could do to avoid the threat from being 
carried out. A threat in coercive diplomacy is always coupled with a demand. The demand is 
clear the target has to stop or undo what they are doing or planning to do or they will face 
consequences. If the threat is not creating behavioral change from the adversary and the 
demand is not met, the coercer risks loss of face or having to escalate to limited use of force 
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or full scale war. Success of coercive diplomacy is measured in the absence of using military 
power, or at least keeps it to a minimum, while still get what you asked for. At the same time 
military power is an inherent part of the theory because it’s what makes the opponent yield. 
The threat offer an alternative to military action by persuading the adversary to cease his 
aggression rather than bludgeon him into stopping(George1993:5).  
4.2 Schelling: The origination of George Schelling’s theorizing was to expand the 
understanding of game theory by go beyond the zero-sum assumption to look at negotiations 
or “games in which the element of conflict provides the dramatic interest, mutual dependence 
is part of the logical structure and demands some kind of collaboration or mutual 
accommodation-tacit, if not explicit-even if only in the avoidance of mutual 
disaster”(Schelling1958:203). His goal was to understand the dynamic interaction in 
bargaining situations between states, so he advanced a theory indicating that conflicts are not 
zero- sum games, but consisting of bargaining and some common interests that can only be 
realized through cooperation, the strategy of conflict should therefore be preoccupied with 
“exploitation of potential forces” (coercion) instead of application of force (brute 
force)(Jordan2015:10).  
The theorizing on the logic of coercion were elaborated in his book “Arms and Influence” and 
based on deduction, an approach that starts with general truths or propositions, proceeds 
through logic reasoning towards explanations of single occurrences in order to derive more 
general theories as a basis for empirical studies(Moses&Knutsen2012:22). Schelling started 
with the assumption of unitary actor rationality (often used in cost- benefit models), a so- 
called axiom which does not have to be based on proof or evidence, to logically deduce five 
necessary conditions for compellence success (Schelling2008; Jakobsen2011:156) It structure 
the premise of the proposition, based on mathematically logic, which makes it possible to 
deduce consequences, of each condition outlined in the coercion theory. It makes the 
argument logical consistent, but the core, can or cannot be true. The rationality assumption, is 
one such example, there is no humans who are or is acting 100% rational all the time, and the 
decision makers in a state is made up of humans, so the assumption is not derived from real 
world. Nevertheless, “the point of models is to approximate in very crude fashion some real 
situation, to capture the complex events of the real world, which can give us insight and 
guidance in analyzing these events”(Shepsle&Bonchek1997:9),so it’s useful to generate 
testable theories. Moreover rationality in this theoretical sense means individuals or states 
maximize the expected gains and minimize the expected losses based on the available 
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information and possible trajectories of action, and not that they are all-knowing perfectly 
rational humans.     
The logic of Compellence: Schelling used the terminology of compellence in his theorizing 
of coercion and contrasted it with deterrence. Compellence includes both reactive and active 
use of force where the aim is to get the target to alter its behavior. Schelling argued the logic 
of brute force differed from the threats of force (coercion). He contrasted brute force with 
coercion for several reasons: Brute force is concerned with enemy strength, and this strength 
is usually measured relative to enemy’s strength, so opposing strengths may cancel each other 
out. Coercive power is the power to hurt. It is not reduced by the enemy’s power to hurt in 
return. “The willingness to hurt, credibility of a threat, and the ability to exploit the power to 
hurt will indeed depend on how much the adversary can hurt in return; but there is little or 
nothing about an adversary’s pain that directly reduces one’s own”(Schelling2008:3). It gives 
the weaker part of a coercive duel the opportunity to gain a more favorable outcome than a 
stronger adversary if the weaker part has the ability and credibility to threaten something the 
adversary values, unless the stronger can make a similar threat. North Korea’s assurances of a 
massive retaliation against Seoul in case of American intervention can prove as a good 
illustration. The U.S. has the ability to destroy North Korea, but not without North Korea 
being able to inflict pain upon them (It have many soldiers stationed in South Korea) or their 
allies.  The ability to hurt requires knowledge of what the adversary treasures and what scares 
him or his allies, and likewise the adversary need to know what kind of behavior will trigger a 
reaction of force and or causes it to be withheld so pain and suffering is contingent on 
adversary’s behavior(Schelling2008:4) “Brute force succeeds when it is used, whereas the 
power to hurt is most successful when held in reserve”(Schelling2008:3). Seoul will be of 
little value after the war has started. The strategic value rests on the ability to inflict pain, 
regardless of ability to defeat an adversary. The asymmetry in balance of capabilities does not 
necessarily equal coercive success according to this logic.    
The Art of Commitment rests on two equally important aspects; the adversary has to believe 
the credibility of the threat of force, but also the credibility of the assurance of its absence 
after compliance(Jordan2015:12). The logic goes both ways, if the adversary doubts the threat 
he won’t comply, if the adversary assume pain will be inflicted regardless of his behavior he 
won’t comply either. A compellent assurance should be expressed explicitly as opposed to 
deterrent one where it’s often implicit. Compellent commitment can be created by initiating 
action: “To compel an enemy’s retreat, by some threat of engagement, I have to be committed 
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to move. “The threat that compels often requires that the punishment be administered until the 
other acts rather than if he acts. This is because often the only way to be committed to an 
action is to initiate it. This means the action initiated has to be tolerated over whatever time 
necessary for the pressure to work on the other side” (Schelling2008:70) Schelling turned 
conventional wisdom on its head when he pointed to the strategic logic of this; to make the 
adversary believe your commitment, let the adversary have the next move, if the next move is 
“the last chance to disaster”(Schelling2008:44). The less maneuver room you have to yield 
the stronger pressure on the adversary to do so. Let the adversary make the rational 
calculation if he will face the music or back off.  Schelling used a car crash analogy to show 
that in every collision it’s a phase where one of the drivers likely could have avoided the 
situation, and is therefore held responsible. If both parties want to avoid a confrontation, “the 
advantage often goes to the one arranges status quo in its favor, and leave it to the other to 
have a last clear chance to stop or turn aside”(Schelling2008:44/45).   
Brinkmanship: is the manipulation of the shared risk of war that increases the possibility of 
war during a crisis in order to extract concessions (Jordan2015:16).It’s as Schelling wrote 
“the threat that leaves something to chance”. Raising the stakes “while no one could credibly 
threaten nuclear war, the superpowers could credibly threaten to increase its risk, nothing is 
worth a nuclear war but Cuba might be worth 5% of it”(Jordan2015:15), but Schelling warns; 
it works as long as no one is pushed too far, but if the pushing side knows how far that is, it 
will not push that far!(Schelling2008:100). Again, Schelling emphasize an understanding of 
the adversary is necessary to pursue brinkmanship in an efficient and compelling manner. The 
use of limited force can be useful tool for brinkmanship. Schelling identified limited war as a 
generator of risk, because it increased the likelihood of total war since it inflicts direct costs in 
casualties, expenditures or territory, loss of face etc. and exposed both parts to heighten 
risk(Schelling2008:105) “It’s like rocking the boat, to set in motion a process that is not 
always together in one’s control”(Schelling2008:105).   
The non-zero-sum nature of war: Schelling questioned another conventional wisdom by 
claiming that war is not a zero- sum game. There is always room for bargaining, illustrated by 
an historical anecdote from the 2WW where Japan and Germany obviously couldn’t win after 
the tide had turned, but they could “still extract a price in pain and treasure and post-war 
stability and they knew it … the war was costly on both sides, and could be stopped if terms 
could be negotiated”(Schelling2008:126). Furthermore, he wrote “war is always a bargaining 
process, one in which threats and proposals, counter-proposals and counter-threats, offers and 
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assurances, concessions and demonstrations, take the form of action rather than words, or 
actions accompanied by words(Schelling2008:142) The implication is twofold: the 
distribution of gains will influence the bargaining process, and the potential of gains can in 
itself be a source of conflict(Jordan2015:21). Schelling saw this dynamic playing out most 
explicitly and consciously in “limited wars” and consequently in coercive diplomacy. 
Coercive warfare is utilized similarly to blackmail, depends more “on the threat to come than 
damage already done”, but it’s the pace of the diplomacy that govern the action, the bargain 
over distribution of gains takes time, so compliance does not look like submission for the 
adversary(Schelling2008:172).  
These insights were translated into a “theory of compellence” which is not an 
operationalization of variables in itself, but have inspired some of the variables in the ideal 
policy framework, which also builds on George’s abstract theory and comprehensive 
framework consisting of a wide range of factors influencing the use of coercive diplomacy. 
Furthermore, while Schelling distinguished between passive and active forms of coercion; 
deterrence and compellence, George introduced two types of compellence; offensive and 
defensive, in the form of blackmail and coercive diplomacy. George’s definition of the 
phenomenon was more limited than Schelling’s and only covered defensive use, or reactive 
use of threats of military force. He defined Coercive diplomacy as: “efforts to persuade an 
opponent to stop and/or undo an action already embarked upon(George1993:5).  The coercion 
component, the threat of force or limited use of force, has to be of a military character, other 
negative inducements like sanctions is not sufficient to amount as coercive diplomacy.   
4.3 Alexander L. George agreed the abstract theory assumed pure rationality on part of the 
opponent, but emphasized the problem by not taking into account the possibility of 
misperceptions, miscalculations, or that it is affected by values, culture and traditions that 
may differ from the coercive state(George1993:4). The rationality assumption hinges on the 
expectation that the adversary will comply if the cost- benefit calculation is manipulated, so 
the cost of the adversary’s actions are greater than the benefits. For example the threat of 
invasion and regime change in the WMD turnaround case, made Gadhafi see the WMD 
program as a burden rather than asset for his security and compliance followed. This 
manipulation hinges on the credibility of the threat and the promise of the coercer to take 
away at minimum the benefits of the unwanted actions and possibly more. The harm 
promised by the threat has to be greater than the benefits of resistance. The theoretical logic 
of this is that the more you ask for the greater the punishment for non-compliance, and the 
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greater the risk for the coercive state if it has to carry out the threat. The rational mirror 
argument would be that the execution of the threat has to be less costly than letting the 
unwanted behavior pass, for the threat to be credible for the adversary. Moreover the benefit 
of the adversary’s rouge behavior often equals or exceeds the cost it imposes on the potential 
coercer. So if the potential coercer wants to issue a threat to stop the rouge behavior, the 
threat has to inflict greater pain on adversary than the rouge behavior does on him. However 
the credibility of this threat will be undermined if the adversary calculates that the coercer is 
unlikely to carry out the threat, because the cost of carrying out it is higher than the damage 
caused by the rouge behavior. This is a weakness with the rational, logical approach, that 
Schelling as we remember solved by manipulation of risk, and art of commitment. The 
rationality calculation is not only made on the basis of force but also influenced as coercive 
diplomacy theory indicates by assurances and inducements.   
George was critical of the rationality assumption and skeptical of the viability of 
operationalizing abstract theories by means of logical deduction and hypothesis testing to 
make it policy- relevant(Jakobsen2011:157).  He derived his theoretical framework bottom up 
by induction. This way of theory- building starts with the empirical particulars on the ground, 
and generates more general theories at a higher level(Moses&Knutsen2012:22). He pointed 
out that history is “sui generis”, to generalize from one historical crisis to another is 
dangerous and almost guarantees error (George, Hall, Simons1971:xii) and favored theory- 
building drawing general conclusions from particular episodes, because variables in the 
moment of danger is so numerous that they elude analysis(George, Hall, Simons1971:xii). 
George was concerned with the contextual variables and proposed to “go beyond crude 
empiricism to see what’s special about the case at hand, just as historians use generalization 
as a sketch before filling in with a narrower theory or facts”(George1993:xiii). General 
theories in his view must be supplemented with more particular theories, and/ or more fine-
grained models. The caveat with this is that we risk qualify almost every assertion to the point 
of where the analytical value disappears. Theory can capture some generalizable insights that 
can be applied a cross- cases, as long as the variables in the theory does not rest on 
unattainable conditions. 
George identified a checklist of conditions influencing coercive success by means of 
qualitative case study analysis case studies(Jakobsen2011:157). It made his operationalized 
theoretical framework very context dependent and hard to translate into general theory with 
an explanatory range beyond the single case. It is therefore not surprising that George in his 
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follow up study in 1993 emphasized that the abstract theory in itself is not a strategy of 
coercive diplomacy. The abstract theory give insight to the logic and general characteristics 
“with which its presumed efficacy rests”, but should not be “a basis for judging whether 
coercive diplomacy is likely to be effective in a particular situation”(George1993:3). The 
purpose of the general, abstract theory of coercive diplomacy was to “be useful for scholars 
who study past cases to develop generic knowledge of the conditions and processes associated 
with success or failure”(George1993:4). 
George argued motivations influence the prospects for compliance. He found two similar 
intertwined causes; what the coercer demands and how strongly disinclined the adversary is to 
comply with that demand”(George1993:12). The logic here is that the motivation to comply is 
dependent on what’s being asked for, if the coercer ask for a small concession it’s easier for 
the target to let it go and comply. If the coercer asked for a lot or something of vital interest 
“requiring an opponent to give up material gains… also require him to pay the often 
substantial psychological and political cost of complying with the demand”(George1993:12). 
The fact that it’s the adversary’s motives that decided whether the coercion is likely to 
succeed or not, makes it difficult to make real time calculations for the coercer, because the 
adversary’s perception does not necessarily correlates to what the coercer expect him to 
believe. The motives are founded on material or tangible interest and psychological/ 
ideational variables. Furthermore, the general theory asserts “it’s not enough for a coercer to 
have issue a threat with a demand that is potent and credible enough to convince the adversary 
to comply, rather it’s the adversary’s estimate of the credibility and potency of the threat that 
is critical”(George1993:14). Like Schelling he saw the use of “limited force” as one way “to 
demonstrate resolution to protect one’s interests and to establish credibility of one’s 
determination to use more if necessary”(George1993:5). 
Given the coercive diplomacy outcome is very sensitive to the relative motivations in the 
duel, George advice the coercers to think through the choice or type of demand made to the 
opponent, because it’s what shapes the relative motivation on the two sides. The motivation 
of the coercing state is influenced by the magnitude of the demand(George1993:12). The 
choice of what to demand to achieve the object is therefore the prime strategic choice for the 
coercer since it affects both states motivations of the willingness to resist or comply, carry out 
the threat or back down.  The choice should be based on only the most important interests, to 
create asymmetry of motivation favoring the coercer over the adversary; if not the abstract 
theory projects the coercive attempts will favor the adversary and fail. The abstract, general 
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theory indicates the question of how much of a threat or combinations of threats, inducements 
and assurances is needed for successful coercion, is based on what one demand from the 
adversary and how strongly disinclined he is to comply with the demand(George1993:12).  
The resistance of the adversary is dependent on what’s asked from him; coerced regime 
change is harder to achieve then abstention from terrorism. It’s a difference between asking to 
stop what an adversary is doing or being asked undo what’s already been done, the former 
generally ask for less than the latter, and may be easier to accomplish(George1993:6). 
Survival was obviously more important for Gadhafi than any motivation the Americans could 
muster, so the likelihood for coercive success in the humanitarian coercion case according to 
the abstract theory was relatively small.  
4.4 The role of inducement and assurances One way to manipulate the coercive duel 
and avoid a zero-sum conflict is to make room for bargaining by offer the other party 
something to gain. Inducements and assurances are important aspects of this process, 
providing positive incentives for compliance and making concessions less costly for the 
adversary both perceptional in the eyes of domestic and international audiences and materially 
by acquiring tangible benefits from the process. “Positive inducements involves either a 
transfer of resources to the target or the offer of things that do not involve resource transfer 
but that are nonetheless of tangible benefit to the target”(Art2004:7). The inducements are the 
so called “carrot” in international negotiations. The promise of something good or positive if 
the adversary complies with the demands. It can be a policy concessions or economic favor. 
Positive inducements cannot constitute coercive diplomacy in itself, because a positive- sum 
negotiation would not involve threats of coercive character, although potential loss of 
potential gains, can have same effect on the adversary. Military force supporting diplomacy 
“can enhance the scope for resolving crisis and conflicts, where persuasion, inducement and 
assurances prove ineffective”, since “inducements increase the value of concessions and 
decrease the political cost of capitulation by enabling leaders to claim victory even when 
defeated”(Byman&Waxman2002:9) Even more negative directed inducement, like “economic 
sanctions, the withholding of benefits to a target, cessation of benefits that a target currently 
enjoys, or more generally any coercive attempt that does not entail some deployment of 
military power”(Art2004:7) can be part of the strategy, but need to be coupled with military 
threats or limited force to be defined as coercive diplomacy. The positive inducements are 
therefore important in manipulation of the adversary’s rational calculations or psychological 
motivation for compliance. Inducements are often contrasted with the use of force as if they 
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have opposite effect, but an adversary’s response to negative inducements will often be 
considerably different from the promise of reward, since the former instill fear and resistance 
and can influence the capability for rational calculation, while the latter is more likely to 
induce the target to evaluate the benefits against the cost of alter its behavior 
(Cheraghlou2015:27).  Positive inducements can also influence the trust between the two 
parties in the negotiation and how the attempt to influence behavior is perceived, it also 
affects the impact of assurances, for example a promise that compliance by one demand won’t 
be followed by another.  
Analytically, it’s difficult to distinguish the mechanisms; whether it was the positive 
inducements or the coercion that had any effect, or if the carrots would matter when coupled 
with coercion - perhaps the positive inducements is just a “loser’s prize” for an inevitable 
outcome based on the raw military power? The power of the combination is important 
because if a state only relies on positive inducements it can be victim of blackmailing, since 
other state can seek confrontation to be bought off. Just like states normally won’t pay ransom 
for hostages to avoid its citizen becoming more vulnerable to kidnappings. Robert J. Art 
found that the timing of inducements mattered for the outcome and that the assurance should 
be offered while or after the threat had been made, but not before(Art2003:397).  
Any coercive threat requires corresponding assurances. An assurance is completing the 
structure of a threat, in making the threatened consequences persuasively conditional on 
behavior so the adversary is offered a choice(Schelling2008:74); stop your WMD program or 
we will oust you from power. The object of a threat is to give somebody a choice; it can be 
promise of amnesty, safe passage, forgiveness, against pressure to give up more territory after 
you agreed to give up some, or for more money after an initial payment(Schelling2008:74) 
It’s what Schelling’s labelled “clarity concerning the precise terms of settlement if the crisis” 
in his theory of compellence. The assurance can build trust between the two parties and make 
it more beneficial or less costly to comply for the adversary. The starkest assurance an 
adversary can get is promise of his own survival. This is what Gadhafi demanded several 
times in the WMD turnaround case. The credibility of assurances is just as important as of the 
threat.  
4.5 Coercive mechanisms and instruments: The first thing a coercer has to do is to 
make a calculation of its ability to deny the adversary its objectives with little cost. It’s the 
dynamic part of the strategy; it depends on the end goal for the coercion and the military, 
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economic and societal strength of the adversary. The coercive instruments and mechanisms a 
coercer has available and is willing to use, can influence the calculation for a successful 
attempt. Coercive mechanisms is in the words of Byman & Waxman the middle link between 
means-end chain in coercive diplomacy, and answers the question of why and how coercion 
works, it’s the way the coercer is trying to manipulate adversary’s decision making to make 
him alter his behavior(Byman&Waxman2002:48-50). These mechanisms are typically; 
“power base erosion; creating dissatisfaction; political, economic and military decapitation; 
weakening the country as a whole and lastly denial- preventing battlefield success or counter-
coercion(Byman&Waxman2002:50). Coercive mechanisms can be used separately and in 
combination. Coercive instruments are the tangible coercive tools a coercer use to employ the 
coercive mechanisms. Coercive instruments ranges from air strikes, gunboats off shore, 
invasion and lands grabs, to threat of nuclear retaliation, economic sanctions and support of 
insurgencies(Byman&Waxman2002:88). Air power and sanctions have become the preferred 
instruments for western coercers because of their high risk averseness.    
Power- base erosion mechanisms seeks to undercut the adversary’s leaderships support 
among key constituencies, elite groups or important individuals, necessary for keeping on to 
power. “If a coercer can threaten a regime’s grip on power, the leadership may concede to 
avoid losing control or, if it proves recalcitrant changed with a more compliant 
regime”(Byman&Waxman2002:59) In authoritarian regimes- often the adversary of western 
democracies- support from the security establishment, economic oligarchs or key ethnic 
groups can be of vital importance. However, regimes vulnerable to such mechanisms are 
often good at countering it by establishing coup-proof structures like Gadhafi did, with 
overlapping security services, or just lack of strong institutions threatening his power. Power 
base erosion is a difficult mechanism to set in motion and it’s often easier to fan existing 
dissent to escalate the erosion.  There is always a danger that power- base erosion attempts 
can prove counterproductive to the diplomacy part, because a leader would have less room for 
concessions in negotiations, so weakness at home is converted to strength in negotiations 
because the coercers anticipates strong motivation for non- compliance(Cheraghlou2015:31) 
and it negatively affect the trust between the two parties. 
Another coercive mechanism is to destabilize the adversary by creating popular unrest by 
punish the many to change the minds of a few(Byman&Waxman2002:65). Civilian suffering 
can lead to altered behavior because the leadership genuinely care about its citizens, or 
through wide spread protests demanding compliance. Destabilization efforts can also 
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influence normal policy streams if the regime relies on popular input in one way or another 
and possibly undermined the adversary’s capacity to fight(Byman&Waxman:2002:65). A 
foreign power causing harm on civilians, either by crippling sanctions leading to starvation or 
lack of vital medicines or by excessive use of force (these tools are less viable for western 
democracies following international law), can create an opposite effect too and lead to 
popular support for the adversary’s leadership against the invaders. Another illegal coercive 
mechanism is leadership decapitation; it’s based on assassination of the leader to get a 
different and more favorable individual in charge.  Individual leadership matters in all kind of 
ways in international politics, the humanitarian coercion would probably not passed the 
Security Council with Putin at the helm in Russia, while President Medvedev seen as more 
liberal let it pass. Likewise, perhaps another individual in Gadhafi’s closest circle would 
approach internal dissent and external foreign policy in a more reconciliatory manner and 
been a better option than regime change creating chaos and disorder. 
The last common coercive mechanisms “weakening the country as a whole” is based on 
destruction of infrastructure, industrial and communication lines,  and other targets that make 
up a country’s economic strength and social cohesion (Byman&Waxman2002:76). These 
mechanisms are intended to increase the cost of defiance while denial “centers on preventing 
an adversary from gaining the desired benefits of resistance. Denial works when the adversary 
understands he cannot gain benefits and will continue to pay cost if not conceding” 
(Byman&Waxman2002:78) B&W agrees with the abstract theory that coercion differ from 
brute force, and that the perception of benefits matters in coercion, while brute force is about 
physically stopping the adversary regardless of beliefs (Byman&Waxman2002:78). In 
addition to the regular coercive mechanisms, the coercer can utilize so called “second- order 
coercion” which is coercing through a third party, the US might have little leverage of North 
Korea, but can pressure China, a big trading partner of the country, to put pressure on the 
regime(Byman&Waxman2002:82). All these mechanisms are can be used singularly and in 
combination, and can synergistically enhance and undermine each other. There is always a 
risk the mechanisms will not work and backfire against the coercer or create unintended 
consequences influencing the coercive attempt(Cheraghlou2015:33). The coercive 
mechanisms and instruments used in the Libyan cases will be discussed and analyzed in the 
cases and comparative analysis, but the ideal policy framework is not intended on guiding the 




4.6 The road to operationalization:  
The difference between Schelling and George approaches are stark when the theories are 
operationalized into conceptual frameworks. Scholars following Schelling’s path has 
generated parsimonious coercion theories with limited explanatory range (see Pape:1996 and 
Jentleson&Whytock:2005) while George adherents has developed data rich general 
frameworks (Byman&Waxman2002 and Art & Cronin 2004) but some authors like Jakobsen 
has tried combine these approaches (Jakobsen2011:157). Schelling did not make a strong 
effort, but derived five necessary conditions for compellent success (See boxes), George’s 
operationalization efforts deserves closer attention: George did not find the abstract theory 
useful for operationalization and sought to create a policy relevant conceptual framework 
based on in-depth case studies of U.S. coercive diplomacy attempt. George and Simons 
derived a comprehensive checklist of conditions influencing the likelihood of coercive 
diplomacy success (se boxes below). The checklist is very useful for highlighting the 
complexities and dangers of coercive diplomacy, but the high number of explanatory factors 
make translating these conditions into testable frameworks difficult, because it’s impossible 
to discern which the factors causing the success or failure in a given case(Jakobsen2016:284). 
The information rich approach is not suitable for informing pre- or real time crisis 
management, so for policy makers wanting strategic guidance in whether to employ coercive 
diplomacy or not the checklist offers little help. Nevertheless George suggested the coercive 
diplomacy concept consisted of “empty boxes” or variables needed to be filled in by policy 
makers before applying coercive diplomacy in a specific situation: 1) what to demand of the 
opponent 2) whether and how to create a sense of urgency for compliance with the demand 3) 
whether and what kind of punishment to threaten noncompliance and 4) whether to rely only 
on threats or also offer conditional inducements (George1993:7). A detailed rich approach is 
still instructive to operationalization because it distills the essence of the phenomenon and 
Jakobsen utilized both empirical and theoretical insights when he operationalized his four 





*Boxes borrowed from (Jakobsen:2011) 
4.7 Operationalization: The Ideal policy framework: The logic of the general abstract 
theories needs to be synthesized into a conceptual framework to develop testable predictions 
that can be used in hypothesis testing. A conceptual framework is the researcher’s idea on 
how to explore the research problem and should be determined by the research objective and 
the data at hand. The aim of this thesis as previously stated; to do a theory- testing of 
Jakobsen’s “ideal policy” framework, which identifies the minimum conditions for coercive 
success, to see if it holds up to recent empirical data. Jakobsen’s sought to use the abstract 
theoretical and empirical insight to create operational definitions and conceptual framework 
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for cross- case testing. The ideal policy is designed to determine the probability of coercive 
diplomacy success in a given crisis or to explain coercive diplomacy outcomes post hoc with 
as few explanatory factors as possible”(Jakobsen2016:284/285). The weakness is of course 
the black- boxing of the adversary, as opposed to George filling up boxes, so the 
implementation of the “minimum requirements” is necessary, but not sufficient causes for 
success, because any coercive diplomacy attempt may fail because of factors outside the 
coercers control; such as misperception or miscalculation by the opponent 
(Jakobsen2016:285), or because of psychological variables or values, culture and traditions 
not accounted for in the framework. However, the ideal policy has a good empirical track- 
record, so likelihood for success is good if the coercer execute its strategy accordingly. 
Jakobsen operationalized the abstract theory into an “ideal policy”.  First by finding eight 
conditions favoring success (2000) later crystalized into four minimum requirements for 
success (2016). The ideal policy: four minimum conditions for success:  
1. A threat of force or limited use force to defeat the opponent or deny him his objectives 
quickly with little cost:  
2) A sense of urgency or deadline for compliance: 
3) An offer of inducement for compliance:   
4) An assurance to the adversary against future demands 
1) A threat of force to defeat the opponent or deny him his objectives quickly with little costs 
requires communication of the threat through words or actions or both of what demands the 
adversary has to comply with. This hinges on two factors; the threat and demand needs to be 
in the same currency; that is aggression must be accompanied by threat of 
force(Jakobsen2000:4), and the coercer needs to have the capability and will to enforce the 
threat if necessary. “Issuing threats of force that cannot be executed is a recipe for 
failure”(Jakobsen2000:4). It requires the coercer to be able to rationally calculate whether he 
enjoys escalation dominance, the ability increase the threaten cost while denying the 
adversary to counter-coerce, and denial to make the adversary calculate it cannot gain the 
benefits by defying the demand and continue to pay costs if they don’t 
concede(Byman&Waxman2002:78). This capacity to back up the threat needs to be coupled 
with the will to use force. Willingness to use force is necessary for the credibility of the threat 
to convince the adversary that non- compliance would be more costly than compliance. In 
other words so the cost of not complying exceeds the potential gains. The credibility is “also a 
function of the coercer’s reputation, and if the coercer has e record of backing down the 
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credibility of threat would be seriously undermined. Obamas failure to enforce his red line 
towards Syria would make his next target of a red line more doubtful about his intention to 
back up the threats. The credibility of the threat can still be manipulated as Schelling advised, 
the coercer can bases on its power to hurt, set up a situation so the adversary get the last clear 
chance, or other forms of brinkmanship, and it can use inducements and assurances to create a 
non-zero-sum game despite the use of threats. The credibility and willingness to punish non- 
compliance influence the second minimum condition:   
2) A sense of urgency or deadline for compliance: If a coercer signals unwillingness to take 
action the adversary can be induced postpone or defy the demand of compliance. Jakobsens 
ideal policy advices to set a deadline for compliance, but emphasize it may not be sufficient 
threat in itself, so the coercer needs to back the deadline up with “other actions and statements 
signaling that the threat will be executed if the deadline expires”(Jakobsen2000:4). These 
punitive measures needs to be coupled with,  
3) An offer of inducement for compliance which is will enhance the credibility of the 
assurance, help create a non- zero- sum situation, and serve to increase the adversary’s 
probability for compliance. This condition is also grounded in empirical studies by 
George:1993) and( Jakobsen2000:5). The last minimum requirement is:  
4) An assurance to the adversary against future demands. As Schelling writes; the adversary 
would have little incentive to comply if he fears it will result in new 
demands(Jakobsen2000:5) Assurances therefore a confidence- building measures to assure 
the adversary that compliance will not trigger new demands in the future (Jakobsen2016:284)  
Ideal policy amendement: The best way to build scientific knowledge is to systematically 
test and refine theories and propositions. This study has made one refinement and one 
amendment to the ideal policy by emphasizing that “limited force” is part of the first 
minimum condition and by expanding the second minimum conditions to include a “sense of 
urgency” as an alternative to a clear “deadline”. It seems like Jakobsen implicitly intended 
limited force be part of the first minimum requirement since his definition of coercive 
diplomacy includes it and because he has made an effort to operationalize “limited force” into 
a testable variable. Nevertheless, it’s not expressed in his ideal policy framework (2016) I 
include limited force in this research because it’s an important aspect of the phenomenon, and 
might be necessary to demonstrate credibility and will and as Schelling guided; to manipulate 
the adversary’s calculations. It’s therefore a necessary condition for success if a threat proves 
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insufficient. The ideal policy amendment expands the second minimum requirement to 
include a sense of urgency. This limits the explanatory range, but make the framework covers 
more coercion attempts and creates a better equilibrium between the coercion and diplomacy 
component of the phenomenon. A deadline can be unfitting and too risky because of its 
inflexibility and in the public nature of mass media world can make loss of face or domestic 
standing within the adversary country factors contributing to resistance and escalate tension 
when it’s not needed.   
Theoretical implications of the Ideal Policy: One important theoretical implication of the 
ideal policy is to move away from the quest for understanding and focus on the power to hurt. 
The quest for understanding has led many scholars to “abandon Schelling’s rational unitary 
actor assumption in favor of empirically derived actor- specific models built on psychological 
theories, strategic culture and prospect theory, requiring detailed information about, and 
understanding of the adversary’s motivations”(Jakobsen2011:161). This solved the inherent 
problems of the rationality assumption, the undeniable fact that not all decision- makers act 
rationally in high- pressure and high- risks situations, but similarity the information and 
intelligence about American adversaries in today’s world is generally limited and been 
lacking in previous successful and unsuccessful coercive attempts in Europe, Middle East and 
Asia(Jakobsen2011:161). Jakobsen holds that the quest for “obtaining good understanding of 
the adversary’s mindset, intentions and capabilities” has greatly limited the usefulness of 
coercive diplomacy theory and made it difficult to translate theory into policy. This need for 
information is difficult to obtain in the midst of a crisis and creates post hoc explanations with 
little generalizability. The reality is that we lack good understanding and intelligence of the 
current western adversaries, and as Jakobsen notes it is/was lacking in coercive diplomacy 
attempts with states such as Serbia, Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Afghanistan, interestingly the 
WMD turnaround case might be an exception(Jakobsen2011:161; 
Jentleson&Whytock2005:75-76). Coercion succeeds in these cases because the coercer has 
the power to hurt, and it’s threats and actions instills fear in the mind of the adversary, like 
American use of force in Afghanistan and Iraq made Gadhafi fear he was next so continued 
non- compliance might be too costly(Jakobsen2011:165). A changed approach could make 
coercive diplomacy theory more policy relevant and offer solutions instead of only identifying 
limitations and problems.  
This theoretical perspective necessitates analytical shift from motivations and intentions to 
relative balance of capabilities “The coercion analysis has not focused on some objectively 
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“real” costs and benefits of various policy choices, but on what the adversary perceives as 
costs and benefits”(Byman&Waxman2002:11). This problem can be solved by leaving the 
corresponding conditions out of the theory.  Policy calculations made on objective material 
terms, based on factual balance of capabilities (escalation dominance and denial) instead of 
motivation, and rely on the power to hurt instead of power to understand. The power to hurt, 
is the ability of the coercer to credibly threaten to hurt the adversary enough to make cost of 
noncompliance too high, lack of that ability results in a failed coercion attempt whether the 
coercer understands the adversary or not(Jakobsen2011:165). The question a coercer should 
ask before engaging in coercive diplomacy is therefore: “Can I make sanctions effective; can I 
credibly threaten and use limited force in a way that will make it hard/ impossible for the 
target to continue its hostile actions; can I deny the target the opportunity to engage in 
effective counter-coercion?”(Jakobsen2011:165). If the answer is no, coercion is likely to fail. 
If no viable military options exists (think North Korea- always ready to destroy Seoul) or the 
regime has proved resilient in facing economic sanctions and isolation, and have counter- 
coercion points that can impose costs on the coercer or its allies the coercive attempt is likely 
to fail. It’s rational for the adversary to not comply, and the coercer should avoid engaging in 
coercive diplomacy.  
The estimation of balance of capabilities rests on the assumptions that coercer can rationally 
calculate the relative balance of capabilities between itself and the adversary. The rationality 
assumption anticipates that the state acts rational and purposive in achieving their objectives. 
“a rational foreign policy decision- making process would include statement of objectives, 
consideration of all feasible alternatives in terms of existing capabilities available to the state, 
the relative likelihood of attaining these objectives by the various alternatives under 
consideration, and the benefits and cost associated with each 
alternative”(Viotti&Kauppi2010:43). This will lead the state to pursue the foreign policy 
objective maximizing utility or at least achieve an acceptable outcome. A state is able to 
calculate based on a material analysis whether another state is able to inflict pain on him, 
without being able to push back. It excludes what George characterized as “psychological 
variables or values, culture and traditions that might differ among both the coercer and 
adversary state”(George1993:4).The rationality assumption clearly has some weaknesses, but 
if we accept the premise, how should the state measure the balance of capabilities? The 
measurement of the balance of capabilities will always be relative to the opposite state. What 
is its military capabilities, defense expenditure, and geographic location, technological and 
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diplomatic strength? How can these assets hinder or threaten a successful coercion attempt. 
What Byman & Waxman termed “escalation dominance” and Pape termed “denial”. It 
requires some intelligence and insight, but far from the same level as understanding an 
adversary’s motives. In many coercive attempts the power asymmetry is given, because a 
state would be more cautious to coerce a state equal or almost equal to its military power. The 
U.S and allies didn’t have to worry about Gadhafi’s military power, because it was too weak 
to inflict pain on the US and Europe. This calculation becomes more complicated if an 
adversary has better military capabilities. A useful example is the a previously mentioned the 
current North Korean crisis. The regime has strong counter coercion points using its 
proximity to Seoul and potential use of nukes as an insurance policy against coercion. The 
destruction it can cause by use of force towards the city, with lots of American personnel and 
citizens and the ability to reach American territories makes a coercive attempt unlikely. 
Although the U.S. enjoys overwhelming military power balance vis a vis the country, the 
capabilities to inflict pain and counter coerce make the rational calculations tilt toward not 
attempting coercive diplomacy. The fact that North Korea might not have second nuclear 
strike capacity creates a “first- striker instability”, and make coercive diplomacy or a “counter 
force doctrine” even more dangerous; “If Kim Jong Un fears the United States and its allies 
are coming after his nuclear forces, his dominant strategic move is to use his nuclear weapons 
as quickly as he can, before he loses them”(Narang&Panda2017). These are the calculations 
of balance of capabilities a coercer and adversary has to rationally assess before initiating 
coercion and backing off or stand its ground. 
Limited force: The last operational point on the ideal policy framework is the definition of 
limited force. Limited use of force: George’s definition of limited use force as 
“exemplary…by use of just enough force of appropriate kind to demonstrate resolution to 
protect one’s interests and to establish the credibility of one’s determination to use more force 
if necessary”(George1993:5) is too vague for conceptualization. He emphasized that 
“signaling, bargaining and negotiation is important dimensions of coercive diplomacy” 
(George1993:6) and that the use of limited force would be a signal of what Schelling 
described as “the threat of damage, or of more damage to come”(Schelling:1966:3). But “just 
enough” is difficult to translate into operationalized variables separate clearly from “brute 
force”. Jakobsen proposed a solution based on Freedman and Pape: limited force is defined as 
use of force that still let the adversary “retain the capacity for organized military 
resistance”(Pape1996:13). “Force is limited when it does, and is not intended to leave the 
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adversary defenseless, and without ability to fight back” (Freedman1998:16; 
Jakobsen2011:162/3). It makes the definition observable and easier to measure, since “it 
includes communication of the limited intent to the adversary and that the military operations 
do not achieve decisive outcomes” (Jakobsen2011:163). Byman & Waxman (2002) propose a 
similar distinction predicated on that “brute force leaves the adversary with no choice, it has 
to fight back or face destruction, while coercion gives it a choice, and most crisis involving 
coercion fall along the continuum between brute force and coercion” 
(Byman&Waxman2002:5). The most popular military tools in conflicts without vital national 
interest or outside the homeland, like air campaigns, will usually not decide the outcome 
outright, and as long as the different components, including land power, are not used together 
in a comprehensive full- scale attack with the intention of decisive victory, the use of force is 
limited.  
This crude distinction creates some paradoxes as Jakobsen notes “successful limited military 
operations such as the use of special forces to rescue hostages will be classified as full-scale 
force because they settle the issue at hand, while major air campaign will be classified as 
limited use of force”(Jakobsen2011:163). Here one would ask if the Libyan attack in 2011 
would be classified as a limited use of force, given the western use of air power was 
combined with local forces on the ground. The initial stage would be defined as a coercive 
diplomacy attempt, but it would eventually fail, because the use of force didn’t produce 











5 Outline of cases:  
The two empirical cases used for testing the ideal policy framework are the coercive 
diplomacy attempts directed towards Libya’s dictator Muhamad Gadhafi. The first case is the 
successful nuclear turnaround attempt to coerce Gadhafi to undo his WMD program in 2003. 
The second case is the unsuccessful humanitarian coercion attempt intended to prevent 
Gadhafi from mass atrocities in Benghazi 2011. The second coercive diplomacy attempt led 
to limited use of military force which quickly escalated to brute force and produced a regime 
change. These cases are interesting because they are narrow in time revolving the same 
regime, but with different outcomes. The first case proved it was possible to coerce Gadhafi, 
so the question we have to ask is; what made the second attempt different? The following 
outline would hopefully provide the answer and serve as a good basis for ideal policy 
framework- testing and a comparative analysis. 
5.1 Case 1: Gadhafi’s WMD- Turnaround: Coercive Diplomacy Success   
The focus in this case will be the four theoretical conditions outlined in the ideal policy 
framework to falsify or validate the hypotheses and to do a comparative analysis as proscribed 
by the structured, focused comparison method. The first point to investigate is if there was a 
threat of force or limited force to defeat Gadhafi and deny him his objectives quickly with 
little cost. The debate after Gadhafi gave up the WMD program has revolved around whether 
it was a product of diplomacy or coercion. Later contributions have emphasized the 
combination of coercion and diplomacy as apprized by coercive diplomacy theory.  This 
outline begins with assessing the arguments for coercion and see if it holds up to the 
definition of coercive diplomacy. This is necessary because the lack of an explicit threat 
makes it important to justify the arguments favoring coercion to support the case for the 
occurrence of a coercive diplomacy attempt. The relative influence of coercion versus 
diplomacy is not the subject here. 
The fact is that the U.S. never issued an explicit threat to Libya over its nuclear program or 
issued an ultimatum or visible military preparations. However, as Christopher A. Stevens 
argues, the case for coercive diplomacy rests on three arguments: “1) previous military 
engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq worked as implied threats 2) the US partook in a 
campaign of veiled threats that implied readiness to engage in regime change if necessary 3) 
Libya understood the danger, and was able to calculate the asymmetry in motivations 
favoring the U.S.”(Stevens2017:330/331). The latter argument is assessed on the balance of 
capabilities, but it’s safe to say that both the asymmetry in motivations and capabilities 
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favored the U.S. Besides the U.S. had showed willingness to use force to prevent proliferation 
in Iraq and they had the military capabilities needed to defeat Gadhafi with little cost. This 
was evident at the time in 2003 and confirmed in 2011 in the humanitarian coercion case 
when military force was used against Gadhafi. The veiled and implied threats from the Bush 
Administration came in three different ways; in formal policy documents and doctrines, in 
demonstrated use of military force, and in broad and directed statements from administration 
officials, singling out nuclear proliferators in general and Libya in particular. The doctrinal 
willingness to use force was manifested in the National Security Strategy in September 2002. 
It stated that “our immediate focus will be those terrorist organizations of global reach and 
any terrorist or state sponsor of terrorism which attempts to gain or use WMDs”(NSS2002:6). 
It also emphasized American willingness to go it alone “while the US will constantly strive to 
enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if 
necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such 
terrorists…”(NSS2002:6). This was, as shown in the background chapter, a reversal of 
previous policy, and a formal general expression of American commitment to prevent nuclear 
proliferation.     
The argument supporting implied threats hinges on the changed security context after 9/11. It 
created a “window of opportunity” for the U.S. to use military force abroad and go after states 
that had supported the terrorist attacks by providing safe havens for terrorists. These efforts 
soon expanded to include rogue regimes engaged in nuclear proliferation. The official 
American response after the disarmament of Libya claimed the decision was “a product of 
America’s determination over the preceding years following 9/11 ‘to work in partnership with 
our allies to combat the nexus of terrorism and WMD’”(Bowen2006:50)  The use of force in 
Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrated willingness and capability to enforce the policy change if 
the adversary didn’t comply. It proved that the Texan President George W. Bush were 
certainly not “all hat and no cattle”. He talked big, but backed up his words with action. This 
show of willingness is vital for the credibility of the threat, and hard to achieve and easy to 
loose, but Gadhafi got the point.  
All the veiled threats coming from the Bush administration has to be interpreted in the light of 
the changed security context. Similar statements would have been perceived differently by 
Gadhafi prior to 9/11. The statement and action coming from Bush and his administration in 
real time showed a “consistent willingness to defend American interests regardless of 
international public opinion, suggesting additional targets beyond Afghanistan and Iraq … 
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This response frightened Gadhafi and left him wondering if he was next”(Stevens2017:331). 
Gadhafi even phoned the President of Egypt to express his concern for an American 
attack(Jakobsen2012:501). The case for veiled threats hinges on statements from central 
officials in the Bush Administration. Stevens (2017) found several occasions of veiled threats 
starting in December 2001 when Libya was called out in US media for being a state sponsor 
of WMD terrorism(Stevens2017:333). Stevens identifies similar statements by Secretary of 
State Colin Powell, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, CIA Director George Tenet, and 
Bush himself; all emphasizing that the country still had a way to go to be accepted back into 
the international community since their recent support for the fight against terrorism was only 
partly so, and the two latter in a tougher manner linking the country to the “Axis of 
Evil”(Stevens2017:33), a label the country initially had avoided, which can be used as an 
argument against the credibility of veiled threats. Libya was also put on notice by President 
Bush on a question at a news conference prior to the turnaround: “Question: ‘Why a policy, 
though, that might go after a country like Libya or Syria?’ Bush: Well first of all, we've got 
all options on the table, because we want to make it very clear to nations that you will not 
threaten the United States or use weapons of mass destruction against us or our allies or 
friends” (Stevens2017:33), (New York Times:2002). The “all option on the table” comments 
is naturally a standard phrase in international relations, but said on the backdrop of one 
invasion and on the eve on another, on direct question about a country, the interpretation of it 
as a veiled threat seems sound.  
Furthermore, Stevens singles out the ever hawkish undersecretary of state for Arms Control 
and International Security, John Bolton, as the lead transmitter of the veiled threats in the 
period; accusing Libya for WMD aspirations, being a rouge state and trying to acquire 
technology for a nuclear weapons program (Stevens2017:334). Bolton also placed Libya in 
company with Iran, Syria and Iraq in an AIPAC speech: “I do not think any of us are naïve 
enough to think that the example of Iraq will be sufficient”(Stevens2017:334). Stevens argues 
Bolton’s veiled threats was enhanced by the fact that Bush did not try to silence or moderate 
him and other officials like Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz, magnifying the coercive message by 
connecting Libya to rouge states(Stevens2017:334). Wolfowitz was even quoted as 
characterizing the Libyan regime as outside the norms of civilized behavior, and when 
presented with talking points in a brief about the country, responding unequivocally: “you 
don't understand. I really want to destroy Qaddafi, not just contain him” (Keller:2002). Bolton 
had thus an important role in transmitting the coercive message, but according to confidential 
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sources, he was not a central actor in the diplomatic efforts, and was unaware of the 
agreement until shortly before its public announcement(Jentleson&Whytock2005:76). It 
illustrates the necessity of confidence building between the coercer and adversary, and the 
importance of credibility when it comes to inducements and assurances and not only use of 
force. 
Regardless, of Bolton’s diminished diplomatic role, the message of coercion was received by 
the Libyan regime, which responded in a variety of ways; claiming it was an expression of 
colonialism, terrorism paid for by Israel, that it was unlawful according to international law 
and that it would create chaos in the region(Stevens2017:335). Gadhafi also confided to world 
leaders (Berlusconi and Blair) and international media (Al Jazeera, BBC) that he was worried 
for his country’s security (Stevens2017:336), because “pursuing a nuclear deterrent could 
pose a more immediate threat to the regime that might lead to US intervention ... and senior 
regime figures, including Gadhafi himself, began to see the pursuit of a nuclear weapons as 
counterproductive in terms of security”(Braut_Hegghammer2008:70-71). This was reiterated 
in the official statement from Tripoli after the turnaround: “Libya believes that the arms race 
will neither serve its security nor the region’s security and contradicts its great concern for a 
world that enjoys peace and security!”(Bowen200648). Later, Gadhafi’s son Saef al- Islam 
accentuated  positive change in the external security environment with progress in the Israeli- 
Palestinian peace process, as part of the new security calculus making nukes 
redundant(Bowen2006:48). 
Jakobsen (2012) support the identification of a coercive component in the turnaround. He 
finds that the reason Gadhafi gave up his WMD program in 2003 was the convergence of 
three factors; “coercion, carrots and confidence- building”. He identifies “the combination of 
US air power, economic sanctions and international isolation” as factors that made the 
country ready to negotiate and then “the fall of Bagdad and the Bush policy on WMD” 
created a sense of urgency as and fear of unacceptable escalation (regime 
change)(Jakobsen2012:496). These two coercive factors was coupled with inducements and 
assurances and created the behavioral change and abandonment of WMD program the US 
sought. Zoubir also notes that coercion played an role in the turnaround “The combination of 
threats to prevent development of WMD, the application of multilateral sanctions, and the 
drop in oil prices all weakened the regime domestically and isolated it internationally… it can 
thus be argued that coercive diplomacy in general and sanctions in particular proved 
successful”(Zoubir2011:282).   
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This empirical evidence shows that the U.S expressed will to use force through implied and 
veiled threats towards Libya, but the last part of the first “ideal policy” condition emphasize 
that adversary’s objectives should be denied quickly with little cost. Did the US have the 
military capabilities to deny Libya its nuclear program with little costs? This part of the 
theoretical condition hinges on the assumption that Gadhafi is able to rationally calculate the 
balance of capabilities, and that those capabilities favored the U.S., so they would be able to 
deny him his objectives without suffer great risk or huge losses themselves. 
The ideal policy are more occupied with capabilities than motivations, and the power 
asymmetry and military balance between the two did not change dramatically in the years 
around the coercion attempt. The U.S. was always dominant, and not vulnerable to Libyan 
counter-coercion. The US had proved it could overthrow a regime quickly, and by the time of 
this coercion attempts, with relatively little costs (later it proved a lot more costly, in terms of 
money and casualties, which can have influenced Gadhafi in the second case). The question is 
if it was rational for Gadhafi to calculate that when the US had the will and capabilities to act, 
if he had any credible counter-coerce measures that could make them hesitate and calculate 
differently. This ability is often called “escalation dominance” in the coercion theory 
literature; “the ability to increase the threatened costs to the adversary while denying the 
adversary the opportunity to negate those costs or counter 
escalate”(Byman&Waxman2003:38). There is no doubt the US could inflict more cost and 
pain on Libya than what they could in return. It’s hard to see how Libya in any way could 
affect the US in a harmful way that would make them recalculate their options. 
The military balance between Libya and the US is extremely asymmetric, with the US as the 
sole superpower with enormous resources both technologically and in share numbers of 
manpower. Indeed, one likely reason the Reagan administration chose Libya as its target to 
take a strong public stand against the state-supported terrorism in the 1980s was because it 
appeared much more vulnerable to political, economic and military pressure than other 
potential adversaries(George1993:53). Gadhafi was well-aware of US airpower which he had 
experienced first-hand under the bombing in 1986, which established a precedent for use of 
retaliatory air power(Crenshaw2004:306) against terrorism. The coercive attempt in 1986 was 
limited to a single raid because the American public wouldn’t support extensive 
operations(Pape1996:20/21), mostly because of president Reagans misadventures in the Iran 
Contras scandal.  
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This time there were no such domestic U.S. constrains. The Iraq-war had considerable 
bipartisan political support, and a majority of Americans supported the war effort at the 
time(Stevens2017:337). The international sanctions and isolation of Libya meant that there 
were few Americans in the country, so the prospect of getting all Americans, and even 
western citizens, swiftly out of the country before using force looked good. The U.S. had met 
considerable resistance from NATO- allies in Europe and the prospect of allied help and 
support, could in worst case scenario, be reduced to a handful of “special relationships” (UK, 
Denmark, Poland). Even without access to strategic bases in Greece and other places in the 
Mediterranean used in the 2011 intervention. The military operation directed towards Gadhafi 
would have high probability of success.  Gadhafi on his side had no real counter coercion 
points, proved counter factually for this case in case number two.   
It’s now established that Gadhafi did not have any counter coercion points, but was he aware 
of the threats and will to use military force? Did he perceive a sense of urgency? There was 
never issued a timeline or deadline for compliance. The literature is somehow divergent on 
this issue. Stevens found a “moderate” sense of urgency; “the administration conveyed a 
sense of issue urgency, but the lack of a deadline and other compelling interests that 
Washington was pushing at the time moderated the sense of urgency”(Stevens2017:326). 
There are however good reasons to characterize the sense of urgency as higher than just 
moderate.  The aforementioned implied and veiled threats created urgency in itself, but there 
are three additional arguments favoring a higher sense of urgency; Libyan reaction to 9/11 
and later the short timeline from the Iraq intervention to Gadhafi’s turnaround, Gadhafi’s own 
statements and the interdiction of BBC China. The two former arguments is definitely part of 
the implied and veiled threats too, but deserve some attention in their own right. 
This swift recalculation of Libya’s security strategy expressed by the Libyan turnaround came 
just days after the invasion of Iraq. This tempt us to see causality between the two 
occurrences, but Palkki & Smith warns that this is an argument without 
end(Palkki&Smith2012:293). Other analysts points to the fact that Libya had already reached 
out to the British diplomats long before the invasion; “the Libyan regime had made 
diplomatic offers including the WMD program on several occasions since 1992, but the 
regimes actual behavior made them look insincere”(Jakobsen2012:500). Here it can be 
counter- argued that the timing of the more genuine outreach does not necessarily support the 
diplomatic over the coercive path, because it came at the backdrop of a sustained American 
pressure, all the way back to the invasion of Afghanistan, and connected with a series of 
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veiled threats, including the Iraq war. Gadhafi’s instant reaction to the 9/11  when he was one 
of the first to condemn it and shortly after cooperated with the US on investigating the attacks 
in very serious ways(Jentleson&Whytock2005:72), shows that he was quick to understand 
changes in the external the security context and acted accordingly.  
Jakobsen supports this; “the Libyan behavior prior to 9/11 and the fall of Saddam was devoid 
of any sense of urgency”(Jakobsen2012:501). Braut- Hegghammer interviewed sources close 
to the decision making process, and found evidence that indicates a change in power balance 
within the regime in favor of abandoning the WMD program after 9/11for two reasons; “not 
only did the direct costs of the nuclear weapons project adversely affect the regime’s domestic 
standing, pursuing a nuclear deterrent could also pose a more immediate threat to the regime 
as it might lead to a U.S. intervention to topple the Libyan regime” (Braut-
Hegghammer2009:7-8). Gadhafi’s statements backs up these assertions, in March 2004, he 
explained to congressional delegations that “one of the reasons… he was giving up the 
WMDs was he did not want to become the next Saddam Hussein, and he did not want his 
people to be subjected to military efforts seen in Iraq”(Palkki&Smith2012:273), whereas 
Foreign Minister Shalgam claimed Libya had not been scared into action by use of force 
against Saddam Hussein(Bowen2006:49).  
The case for urgency also builds on the interdiction of the BBC China ship in Taranto, Italy 
carrying centrifuge equipment from North Korea to Libya. The successful intelligence 
operation disclosed “centrifuge technology purchased from the Khan 
network”(Jentleson&Whytock2005:74), confirmed suspicions of the regimes previous 
sincerity and  “has often been described as influential on the talks: the argument is that it 
forced Gadhafi to commit to the deal  by blowing Libya’s cover”(Braut-
Hegghammer2016:214). This seems plausible given that the Libyan side were still denying it 
even had a nuclear program prior to the interdiction (Palkki&Smith2012:273) Leading 
American administration officials John Bolton and Condoleezza Rice confirmed this 
narrative. Braut-Hegghammer quotes Libyan and British sources telling otherwise; “Libyan 
regime figures stressed it had little importance, and the British Foreign minister proscribed 
the result to ‘painstaking diplomacy’ over many years” which makes her conclude “there is 
little reason to believe that the BBC incident was pivotal in the Libyan decision”(Braut-
Hegghammer2016:214; Bowen2005:50). This is a stark conclusion that needs a little 
pushback because “the interception demonstrated significant knowledge about Libya’s 
clandestine nuclear network, and by placing evidence on the table, the US limited Libya’s 
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options in the negotiations”(Bowen2006:66). It gave leverage to pressure Libya to admit its 
WMD capabilities which brought negotiations faster towards a conclusion. The concessions 
simultaneously made the threats of use of force all the more real. There was no way to deny 
the program anymore.    
The military sense of urgency was coupled by an economic sense of urgency, where the 
country badly needed American technology for oil and gas development. The fact that Libya 
had cleared the Lockerbie obstacle away from the path towards diplomatic and economic 
normalization, made the cost- benefit analysis of the WMD program more real. It increased 
the pressure from within the regime towards normalization; “the Libyan regime’s concerns 
about indirect consequences of the nuclear project were rooted in longstanding domestic 
political and economic dissatisfaction”(Braut-Hegghammer2009:7). Libyan economy 
struggled from low oil prices, and had high inequality and unemployment 
rates(Zoubir2011:286). Libya had for many years been under a severe sanctions regime, both 
unilaterally from the U.S and the UN. The US unilateral sanctions were biting because of its 
significant impact on the Libyan oil and gas sectors that was dependent on American 
technology(O’Sullivan2003:193), but had not a direct impact on the economy because Libya 
found other buyers of its oil. However it influenced the country’s investment patterns, and 
made it harder for the country to diversify its economy, and it hindered technological 
development of the country’s oil sector(Palkki&Smith2012:267) 
The UN joined the economic embargo over the Lockerbie bombing. The multilateral 
cooperation made the sanctions more legitimate, efficient and shrewd. Revenues dried up and 
oil production fell drastically. The lack of revenues made it difficult to sustain the generous 
welfare state programs like education, housing, healthcare, food, water and electricity for its 
citizens(Palkki&Smith2012:267, which gave the US considerable coercive 
leverage(Jetleson&Whytock2005:75). The economic urgency, made Libya ripe for the effect 
of positive inducements. The Americans had good cards on it hand, Gadhafi wanted 
“sanctions lifted, a return of US oil companies, normalized diplomatic relations, recognition 
as a statesman, and guarantees against regime change”(Jakobsen2012:502). The US and UK, 
gave him most of what he wanted. The promise of a normalization of relations engaging in 




Palkki & Smith identified a non- economic inducement “because the prospect of not only 
defusing US Military threat, but also the potential of internationalizing the regime’s fight 
against domestic Islamic opposition groups by joining the West and the US in the War on 
Terror(Palkki&Smith2012:274) made a normalization tempting. This strategy was skillfully 
used by Putin in Chechenia, and the common Islamist enemy had helped establishing 
relations between Libya and the US in the immediate post- 9/11 period. The inducement gave 
tangible benefits and helped Gadhafi from loss of face and humiliation. His reversal of policy 
could be portrayed as a win-win solution for both countries since Libyan leaders believed if 
the problem was solved, Libya could emerge from international 
isolation(Jentelson&Wyhtock2005:48), but Gadhafi still voiced disappointment  he hadn’t 
gotten assurances of protection against a WMD attacks, or assistance in transforming the 
military arsenal to civilian use(Zoubir;2011:285). 
The last “Ideal policy” condition is the assurance to the adversary against future demands. 
The strong assurances Gadhafi got from the Americans that they were satisfied with a policy 
change as opposed to regime change proved vital to his compliance. Time and again Gadhafi 
sought reassurances from the American that their stance on Libya was policy change (full 
WMD disarmament) and not regime change(Jetleson&WHytock2005:74). Litwak calls this 
the centerpiece of the deal, and claim “without such credible security assurance, Gadhafi 
would have had no incentive to relinquish his WMD arsenal”(Palkki&Smith2012:275). This 
reassurance was reconfirmed after the deal was made in a public statement by President 
George W. Bush which welcomed Libya back among the nations(Jakobsen2012:502). 
Counter factual evidence by the American behavior in 2011 undermines the argument for the 
strong and credible assurances. It’s empirically true that the U.S. broke their promise and 
threw Gadhafi under the bus while supporting the rebel’s regime change effort. This is a 
problem for democratic countries with ever changing leadership, a new presidential 
administration does not always agree with the previous ones (as we speak Trump is 
considering walk away from the obligations the Iran deal), so the assurance could have been 
sincere, but been abandoned as a policy due to changed leadership, although some foreign 
policy consistency is a bipartisan virtue. It can also be argued that the security threat was self- 
inflicted Gadhafi knew the risks associated with attacking civilians in his own country.   
5.2 Case 2: Gadhafi’s Fall: Coercive Diplomacy Failure  
The second Libyan case came at the backdrop of the so called Arab spring. Libya’s neighbor 
countries had experienced internal revolt and revolutions starting in December 2010 in 
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Tunisia. Gadhafi had witnessed the presidents in Tunisia and Egypt being forced to resign and 
seemed intent to do everything in his power to avoid such a scenario for himself. The 
rationale for the coercion attempt against Gadhafi was to protect civilians from mass atrocities 
after uprisings had broken out on the 17th of February 2011 in Benghazi.  
The subsequent account of history has been contested. Many sources describe the rebellion in 
Benghazi spreading rapidly to the cities of Misrata and Zawiyah which came under rebels 
control within a week (Matlary2013:113). These rebels gains and subsequent losses left 
Benghazi vulnerable to Gadhafi’s forces, and the promised retribution left relatively little time 
to try measures short of force(Bellamy2016:339). Gadhafi’s language and threats directed 
towards Benghazi invoked images of the horror witnessed in the Rwandan genocide.  Gadhafi 
was quoted saying: “officers have been deployed in all tribes and regions so that they can 
purify all decisions these cockroaches and any Libyan who take arms against Libya will be 
executed”(Bellamy2016:339). Gadhafi’s history of human rights abuses and the potential 
fallout from clashes between rebels and the Libyan government forces could prove disastrous. 
This version of the proceedings is supported by Obama Administration officials Derek 
Chollet and Ben Fisherman who later wrote in Foreign Affairs, that the decisions to act were 
based on “reports … from all corners -diplomatic and intelligence assessments from the U.S. 
and Europe, press reports, and eyewitness accounts- that the regime was perpetrating arbitrary 
arrests, torture and killing”(Chollet&Fisherman2015:154).  
The humanitarian catastrophe narrative is disputed by some scholars, questioning to what 
extent Gadhafi was actually threatening civilians. Kuperman notes “there is no evidence or 
reason to believe Gadhafi had planned or intended to perpetrate a killing campaign” and “the 
world’s top two human rights organizations, Amnesty International and Human Rights 
Watch, never warned of an impending massacre in Libya, nor did US 
Intelligence”(Kauperman2015(2):1). He argues the nature of violence prior to the intervention 
was not targeting peaceful civilians or resorted to indiscriminate force, but aimed at armed 
rebels(Kuperman2013:110)  Moreover, Kuperman claims “the violence was on verge of 
ending when NATO intervened because Gadhafi’s forces had routed the ragtag rebels who 
were retreating home” (Kupermann2015(1):68). It is difficult to assess the validity of these 
claims. Gadhafi might have used less lethal force against civilians than initially feared or 
portrayed in western media, but the regime undisputable wounded and killed unarmed 
protestors(Kuperman2013:110) The fact is that Gadhafi also used a stark language threatening 
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the rebels, and did not backtrack on his statements or give assurances of compliance with 
basic human rights before the military campaign started, justified the military action.        
Issuing of threats with little cost: The initial reaction among the Western powers were 
caution, France said their “true preoccupation is to assure the security of French citizens in 
Libya” likewise the UK anticipated Gadhafi would bot face significant challenge, and refused 
to support EU sanctions against the regime(Davidson2013:314/320). The first formal warning 
came 9 days after the rebellion started, issued 26th of February in the form of UN Security 
Council Resolution 1970. The Resolution did not amount to coercive diplomacy because it 
was not explicitly linked to use of force, but it consisted of three demands:  
  1. Demands an immediate end to the violence and calls for steps to fulfil the legitimate demands of the 
population; 2. Urges the Libyan authorities to:  (a) Act with the utmost restraint, respect human rights and 
international humanitarian law, and allow immediate access for international human rights monitors;  (b) 
Ensure the safety of all foreign nationals and their assets and facilitate the departure of those wishing to leave 
the country;  (c) Ensure the safe passage of humanitarian and medical supplies, and humanitarian agencies and 
workers, into the country; and  (d) Immediately lift restrictions on all forms of media;  3. Requests all Member 
States, to the extent possible, to cooperate in the evacuation of those foreign nationals wishing to leave the 
country; (SecRes/1970)  
The resolution imposed sanctions, arms embargo and travel bans on officials and an asset 
freeze on Libya, and referred Gadhafi to the International Criminal 
Court(Daalder&Stavridis2012:1). In the meantime, between the outbreak of rebellion and the 
Resolution western security calculations had changed drastically. Prime minister David 
Cameron and President Nicolas Sarkozy issued threats linked to sanctions and military force; 
“On the 21 of February, David Cameron said the violence in Libya was ‘completely appalling 
and unacceptable’ and he called for a no fly zone 7 days later(Davidson2013:322) “President 
Sarkozy announced that France would work towards EU sanctions against Gaddafi's regime 
on 23 February, only days later he announced that Gaddafi had to give up 
power”(Davidson2013:317/318).  
In the end of February, the western rhetoric escalated, when David Cameron was threatening 
Gadhafi with military action “promising a no-fly zone and arms shipments to his enemies … 
and even suggested he could send British troops into Libya as a peacekeeping force to stop 
Gaddafi’s henchmen massacring democracy campaigners”(Shipman:2011). On March 4th, the 
UK announced it would deploy military experts to advice the rebels in Eastern 
Libya(Kuperman2013:114), and on March 5, France formally praised the NTC, and 
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recognized the rebel council as Libya’s legitimate government only 5 days 
later(Kuperman2013:124). These efforts were backed up by Obama who gave a similar 
statement expressing support for the Libyan people and warned the Libyan government that 
“it must be held accountable for its failure to meet those responsibilities, and face the cost of 
continued violations of human rights”(Chivvis2015:15). These statements made it clear, 
western powers could use military force if Gadhafi didn’t alter his behavior, although there 
was still no unambiguous commitment or greenlight for use of force.  
The assertive statements were combined with reluctance to use force. In Secretary of Defense 
Robert Gates words on a DoD news briefing; “the resolution provides no authorization for the 
use of armed force. There is no unanimity within NATO for the use of armed force … Our 
job is to give the president the broadest possible decision space and 
options”(Kidwell2015:116). There would still have been time for Gadhafi to recalibrate his 
course. The question is if Gadhafi saw Resolution 1970 and the statements as a credible 
threat, and if he believed this could lead to tougher actions and threat or use of force against 
his regime. 
The international security context was very different from 2003. The US was involved in 
“quagmire” operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the public mood was dominated by war 
fatigue (Pew Research Center, 2011). Economically, the U.S. was still struggling with slow 
recovery from the financial crisis in 2008 and the current president Barack Obama was a lot 
more war- weary than his predecessor. He was supported by his Secretary of Defense that 
warned that “military action was premature and that proposals for it was naïve” while adding 
in a testimony on March 2nd that “military action would require regional support and serious 
postwar planning”(Chivvis2015:15). He clearly intended to avoid the same mistakes as in Iraq 
if military action should lead to the ousting of Gadhafi and regime change. It was significant 
disagreements within the US security and political establishment. There was no obvious 
strategic interest in Libya. Gadhafi was always a nuisance, but after the rapprochement in the 
early 2000s, not threatening national security. A potential military action would be a 
humanitarian intervention with the potential side benefit of getting rid of a long time 
troublemaker in the region. Obama apparently had to be persuaded by Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton, who was convinced by three central women in his Administration with 
firsthand experience in failing to act; UN ambassador Samantha Power, National Security 
Advisor Susan Rice and Anne Marie Slaughter(Matlary2013:117). Based on their experiences 
from Rwanda and scholarly work on genocide they argued for the importance of the R2P 
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principle and to take a more offensive approach after been caught off guard by the Arab 
revolutions. The Americans were aware of the bad optics of US intervening in yet another 
Muslim country, or a potential neo- colonialism framing given Libya’s North African 
location, so “to address these and other concerns, the U.S. Government attempted to form a 
coalition which included both Arab Muslim and African nations to provide legitimacy for any 
military action against the Libyan government”(Quartararo et al2012:144). It was also unclear 
if a “no-fly zone” would solve the problem, and deny Gadhafi his objectives with little costs. 
UN Ambassador Rice worked to go beyond no fly zone to “all necessary measures” to protect 
civilians in the next UN Security Council Resolution, but before committing to use of force 
the American leadership needed to secure American citizens in the country, and get a 
plausible operational plan that could achieve the strategic aims without risking getting stuck 
in another endless war. The first was a lot easier than the second and by “February 25, all 
embassy operations in Libya were suspended, and a chartered ferry took all U.S citizens out 
of the country”(Kidwell2015:108). The operational planning proved more difficult because 
“changing strategic guidance and unclear desired end state made it difficult to do mission 
analysis and obtaining resources”(Kidwell2015:108). There was never any doubt the western 
side could achieve the objectives easily with little cost. The immediate operational purpose 
was later stated in the Resolution 1973, and the operational planning followed accordingly, by 
initially destroying the adversary’s air defense before maintaining air 
supremacy(Kidwell2015:142), but the end state, what to come after the protection of civilians 
was still unknown.   
Consequently, the resolution 1970 and condemnations and threats from world leaders brought 
little change in the Libyan government’s actions or communication. After a period of 
stalemate, status quo was altered when government forces gained ground and started pushing 
the rebels back. Gadhafi’s armed forces started a counter offensive against the rebels 6th of 
March and recaptured lost territory in Ras Lanuf and Brega(Matlary2013:113). These 
developments on the ground, seeing Gadhafi’s army pushing towards Benghazi and forcing 
the rebels on the run, heightened the sense of urgency, for the coercers and was reinforced by 
Gaddafi delivering “several memorable speeches on Libyan state TV in late February and 
early March where he often blamed the protests on foreign intervention, and threatened to 
hunt down the protesters - "alley to alley, house to house."(Al Jazeera:2011). 
A NATO meeting was coming up on March 10- 11, without any clear consensus. France 
pushed for military action in form of a no fly zone, and recognized the National Transitional 
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Council as the legal government in Libya (Matlary2013:113). Germany was as ever skeptical 
of a military approach, “the US remained very hesitant, while the UK proposed three 
preconditions for military action: 1) demonstrable need 2) sound legal basis and 3) strong 
regional support”(Chivvis2015:16/17). The legality demanded a new UN resolution (a holy 
grail for any UK prime minster wanting to use military force in “humanitarian intervention” 
after Tony Blair’s misfortune in Iraq). A UN mandate had not been an expressed demand 
from France, which seemed more intent on action, but regional support would include 
approval from the Arab League, Gulf Cooperation Council and possibly the African Union. It 
also demanded a worsened humanitarian situation on the ground with imminent danger for the 
civilians to justify a military intervention. Moreover the NATO countries decided on 
increasing naval presence, accelerate planning and tighten the embargo, but yet no concrete 
plans for military intervention(Chivvis2015:16), which heightened the sense of urgency for 
Gadhafi too.    
Shortly after the NATO meeting, on the 12th pf March did the Arab League voted in favor of 
a no- fly zone, which must have increased the pressure on Gadhafi that otherwise could have 
expected regional support as self- proclaimed “Pan- Arabian Leader”. The African Union did 
not support military intervention and called for a diplomatic solution. The state of affairs was 
that two of three hindrances of military action were surpassed. Regional support was secured, 
and the security on the ground could always be framed as, and really was, deteriorating. 
However the legality condition probably made Gadhafi believe he could avert foreign 
intervention, given the UN Security Council members like China and Russia’s inclination to 
not favor military intervention. Gadhafi’s problem was that he was caught in a catch22. His 
regime was threatened by the very same people the UN Security Resolution tried to protect. If 
he continued his threats and chose to continue execute them against rebels and civilians, he 
would risk foreign intervention. The fact is that in any case it would be hard to separate rebels 
and civilians from each other for the regime and outside powers increased the likelihood that 
many could potentially be “collateral damage” in a city war fighting scenario by massive 
Gadhafi attacks or by western air power. If he did not quell the resistance it could develop to a 
civil war and regime change from within as seen in neighboring Tunisia and Egypt.  
The relative short timeline of the events were based on the realities on the ground. Gadhafi 
was fast approaching Benghazi and little room was left for negotiations. The refusal to 
comply with the demands in Resolution 1970, or adhere to western threats and warnings, 
made another UN Security Council Resolution necessary. The UN- process got up to speed 
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after the regional support, and on the 17th of March, the Security Council Resolution 1973 
authorized the use of force. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 10 in favor to none 
against, with 5 abstentions (Brazil, China, Germany, India, Russia). Notably NATO member 
Germany did not favor use of military force and South Africa regretted their support in 
international media the day after (Matlary2012:113). The resolution “authorized Member 
States, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, to take all 
necessary measures to protect civilians under threat of attack in the country, including 
Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan 
territory”(SecRes/1973). The message in the Resolution was reinforced the Foreign Minister 
of France, Alain Juppé, when he introduced the resolution:  
“The situation on the ground is more alarming than ever, marked by the violent re-conquest of 
cities that have been released”.  The Security Council could not stand by and “let the 
warmongers flout international legality”.  The world was experiencing “a wave of great 
revolutions that would change the course of history”, but the will of the Libyan people had 
been “trampled under the feet of the Qadhafi regime”.  Earlier Council measures had been 
ignored and violence against Libyan civilians had redoubled…“We have very little time left 
— perhaps only a matter of hours,” he said, adding that each hour and day that passed 
“increased the weight” on the international community’s shoulders. ” (SC/10200) 
This was a clear threat of use of force with unequivocal sense of urgency, if the security of 
civilians was in danger. The balance of capabilities and the will to use military force was 
unquestionable at this point. The resolution authorized the Arab League and those Member 
States wishing to do so to take all measures to protect areas that were being threatened by the 
Gadhafi regime(SC/10200). “The news came as a shattering blow to the Leader, who had 
clearly misjudged the West’s willingness to intervene” (Pargeter2012:234). This surprise is 
not totally unwarranted. The explanation for the change Russian behavior, and passively 
approval of the resolution (abstained for vetoing it) can be found in its leadership at the time. 
American diplomats had convinced Medvedev to abstain from vetoing which probably never 
would have happened with Putin at the helm(Matlary2013:120). The resolution did exclude 
an measures involving occupying force at the insistence of the Lebanese 
government(Chivvis2015:19). There are no indications that would have been a preferable 
option for the allied states, but it could have impacted Gadhafi’s subsequent calculations.  
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By now Gadhafi’s was certainly aware of the supporting state’s ability and will to achieve 
their objective with little cost, but he got little time to change his mind. I took only two days 
from the threat was issued to French planes was bombing Libyan targets. The 23rd of March 
was the beginning of the operation Odyssey Dawn under American command (US 
AFRICOM), and couple of days later, the 23rd  of March did NATO take over the operational 
command, which in reality started the 31th of March under the name Unified 
Protector(Matlary2012:113).  
The coercion attempt is not necessarily finished with the use of force, if it had been limited 
use of force, but it soon became it was employed to support a regime change. Gadhafi himself 
responded in two ways both with outreach and defiance. Right after the passing of the 
Resolution “admitting defeat was not an option for Gadhafi who remained as defiant as 
ever”.(Pargeter2012:235). Illustrated by this lengthy quote:  
“The Colonel certainly made the most of the propaganda opportunities: he warned that the 
no-fly zone was little more than a prelude to full-scale military intervention, and that Western 
boots would soon be landing on Libyan soil. Scenes of Qaddafi surrounded by adoring 
supporters next to the giant golden fist at Bab Al-Aziziya, erected to commemorate the US 
attacks of 1986, were shown repeatedly on state television. Once again, the message was 
clear: the Leader was not going anywhere(Pargeter2012:235). 
Gadhafi’s firm response might be more rational than it looks. NATO definitely helped the 
rebels standing their ground and pushing forward, but it was not given that they had enough 
power and weapons to threaten Tripoli. The fact that the conflict dragged out as long as it did 
shows that he had reasons to be hopeful (one scenario could indeed be a “Syrian partition” of 
the country where he had kept in power in the western part of the country). A strong stance 
could also serve as the best possible opening hand in later negotiations on peace settlements. 
He later coupled this defiance with outreach described again by Pargeter; 
The following month, former Foreign Affairs Secretary Abdel Ati Al-Obeidi told the 
international media that, if the rebels agreed to a ceasefire, Libya would hold free elections 
within a six month transition period. Al-Obeidi went so far as to state that discussions about 
reform could include ‘whether the Leader should stay and in what role, and whether he 
should retire . . . Everything will be on the table… Yet Libyans were used to the Colonel’s 
endless promises and tricks. Given that he had based his entire rule on the false premise that, 
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with no official position, he had nothing to do with running the country, Libyans were hardly 
going to accept any solution that involved him or his family.(Pargeter2012:238) 
The coercive attempt if there ever was one, was now ended, and regime change was become 
the end goal for the operation. Did Gadhafi get too little time to comply after Resolution 
1973? In a coercive diplomacy perspective the answer would be yes. He had gotten threats 
and warnings in the process leading up to the Resolution, but it was the resolution itself that 
made it crystal clear that military force would be used in the case of noncompliance. The 
question is of coercion could have worked to reach the goal. Would it be possible to protect 
civilians with Gadhafi as leader? And would giving him more time have harmed the civilians 
the resolution was supposed to protect? He had been very forthright in his threats of mass 
atrocities and denied offers of negotiations (Matlary2013:120). His track record indicated the 
threats were credible and for the intervention to be effective the coalition had to act rapidly to 
prevent him from attacking Benghazi. Rapid action was necessary for a successful and 
effective use of military force before his troops entered the city, but would at the same time 
make coercion unsuccessful.  
It’s also possible the initial coercion was too weak and not credible enough. Threats were 
issued, but only when the second resolution came was it unconditional. At that point, Obama 
and other western leaders had called for Gadhafi to step down. The force was set in motion by 
France very rapidly after Resolution 1973, so there was not time to offer a negotiated solution 
between the formal threat and use of limited force. Still the process had lasted since the 
rebellion started and world leaders had repeatedly asked Gadhafi to show restraint, so he had 
gotten over a month to change his language and actions. The limited use of force could have 
been used as coercive leverage in negotiations, but the main actors seemed intent on getting 
rid of Gadhafi, so the option was not satisfactory explored. The lack of end game strategy is 
striking, but continued Gadhafi rule was not seen as a preferable or even possible outcome.  
Inducements and assurances: The nature of the post intervention negotiations is also 
contested. Alan Kuperman has criticized the Obama Administration for not seeking a 
diplomatic solution since it “three days into the bombing campaign unilaterally terminated the 
peace negotiations between USAFRICOM and Gadhafi”(Kuperman2015:158). Furthermore, 
according to admiral Charles Kubic the guy who brokered the negotiations, “Gadhafi had  
proposed a peace plan under which  the Libyans would stop all combat operations and 
withdraw all military forces to the outskirts of the cities and assume a defensive posture … 
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Gadhafi was willing to step down and permit a transition government under two conditions 1) 
free passage for his inner circle out of the country 2) enough resources for the Libyan army to 
fight radical islamists ”(Kuperman2015:158). This shows that a coercive diplomacy attempt 
with real willingness to combine the use of force with negotiations could have created a better 
endgame in Libya. In fact Gadhafi had given them the necessary inducement and assurances 
he needed, and if he hadn’t kept to his promise during a truce, it would have been possible to 
turn up the heat and get rid of him by force anyway.  
Allegedly, Gadhafi outreach continued throughout the spring and according to Kuperman, he 
accepted an African Union proposal for immediate cease-fire on April 10th, which was 
supposed to be followed by a national dialogue and negotiations of a new constitution, in 
addition to reparations for the victims”(Kuperman2013:115) this was not acceptable for the 
rebels, which demanded Gadhafi to step down. Obama administration officials have portrayed 
the diplomatic aftermath somewhat differently. Derek Chollet and Ben Fisherman answered 
Kuperman that there was plenty of efforts to negotiate with Gadhafi: “Unfortunately, despite 
the diplomatic efforts of the United States and others- a UN envoy, an African Union 
Initiative, a Russian special envoy, and even a Russian chess player- leaving power was the 
last thing Gadhafi proved interested in”(Chollet&Fischer:2015) He was the one turning the 
mission into regime change, and as evidence for that Chollet and Fischer points to a meeting 
with Gadhafi representatives in July 2011, that proved futile. Chollet and Fischer even quotes 
sources in Gadhafi’s regime claiming he had not believed he would be defeated months into 
the operation, and his inner circle suffered from supreme arrogance and miscalculation”.  
Standing outside the process and not having access to declassified material it’s hard to 
evaluate what’s true or not, but what’s undisputable is the public demands for regime change. 
The criminalization of Gadhafi was definitely counterproductive if the aim was a negotiated 
settlement, since no authoritarian leader will give himself up to the court. Indeed, a little later 
on March the 3rd the International Criminal Court started formal investigations on Gadhafi’s 
crime against humanity (Matlary2013:113). Still it worked as a warning, and it was tangible 
action, it demonstrated that the Security Council would not let rouge behavior towards 
civilian pass without consequences, which we know are counterproductive to a coercive 
diplomacy success, and in this case, would have been the key to an orderly transition, where 
the central government could have remained the power monopoly to avoid the lawlessness 
that came later. It is by no means certain that would be possible to achieve, but the likelihood 
would be greater, than building up new security structures, as was already tried and failed in 
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Iraq. What we know is that the western side obtained their objective cheaply without little 
cost and harm. The Gadhafi regime was an weak adversary, “it’s command structure was 
flawed, its communication was poor, and the initial strikes virtually eliminated its ability to 
mount meaningful defense against the coalitional airpower”(Kidwell2015:148/149). The final 























6. Analysis:   
6.1 Hypothesis Testing:  
The hypotheses in this research predicted the ideal policy could explain whether a coercive 
diplomacy attempt would be successful or not. 
Hypothesis 1: A coercive diplomacy attempt will be successful if the four “minimum 
conditions for success” outlined in the ideal policy are present.    
Hypothesis 2: A coercive diplomacy attempt will be unsuccessful if one or more of the 
“minimum conditions for success” outlined in the ideal policy are not present.  
The outline of the cases above was targeted to validate or falsify the hypotheses. Each 
hypothesis is contingent on the ideal policy framework conditions. The first holds that a 
coercive attempt will be successful if the four conditions are present, the second formulated 
negatively; an attempt would be unsuccessful with the absence of one or more of the 
minimum conditions. The empirical data gathering resulted in confirmation of both 
hypotheses and thus the ideal policy framework.  
The WMD turnaround case was a coercive diplomacy success and all four minimum 
requirements were present in the case as the first hypothesis predicted. The humanitarian 
coercion case was unsuccessful as the second hypothesis predicted because neither the 
minimum condition of inducement nor the minimum condition of assurances was present.   
1. A threat of force or limited use force to defeat the opponent or deny him his objectives 
quickly with little cost:  
Case 1: There was not stated an explicit threat or used limited force in the WMD turnaround 
case, but there had been used demonstrable use of force in Afghanistan and Iraq. There was 
also issued veiled threats from the Bush Administration, clearly perceived and understood by 
Gadhafi according to several sources. The U.S had the ability to defeat the adversary without 
risking high costs themselves. The minimum condition was present. 
Case 2: There were communicated threats of force from all the three main coercers and in the 
form of Resolution 1973. There was also used limited force, which later escalated to brute 
force, so initially the condition was present. The use of force proved the U.S had the ability to 
deny Gadhafi his objectives with little cost and confirmed the calculation in the first case. The 
minimum condition was present.  
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2) A sense of urgency or deadline for compliance: 
Case 1: There was not issued a deadline, but it was a clear sense of urgency. This urgency was 
conditioned on three factors; changed security context after 9/11, fall of Bagdad and lastly the 
interdiction of the BBC China ship made it impossible for Gadhafi to deny his program and 
made him even more vulnerable to U.S. intervention. The minimum condition was present. 
Case 2: It was a clear sense of urgency in this case too. The rapid UN process between the 
first and second mandate is a testament to this. Gadhafi was warned repeatedly that he had to 
reverse his actions quickly to avoid foreign interference. The UN Resolution 1973 created an 
even higher sense of urgency and the rapid use of limited force the same. The minimum 
condition was present.   
3) An offer of inducement for compliance:   
Case 1: There was several inducements offered; normalization of diplomatic relations, 
rollback of sanctions, and access to oil- sector technology, help to convert the WMD 
technology for civilian use, possibility of joining the “war on terror” etc. The minimum 
condition was present.   
Case 2: There was not offered any tangible inducements. The military coercion was only 
coupled with other negative inducements such as assets freeze, arms embargo, travel ban and 
referral to ICC and an offer for Gadhafi to step down. The minimum condition was not 
present. 
4) An assurance to the adversary against future demands 
Case 1: Gadhafi got credible assurances of changes in American policy towards Libya: The 
Americans did not push for regime change as long as he complied to abolish his WMD 
program. The minimum condition was present. 
Case 2: There was not offered any comforting assurances against future demands or for 
Gadhafi to stay in power. The offers to Gadhafi of a negotiated endgame are disputed and did 
not amount to credible assurances. The ICC investigation was looming behind any offer of 




The results of the hypothesis testing of the ideal policy framework would have been different 
without the conceptual amendment including “sense of urgency” to the minimum requirement 
of a “deadline”. This confirms that the lowering of the explanatory range was necessary to 
capture all successful coercive diplomacy cases. The nature of diplomacy is changing as a 
consequence of the communication revolution. Mass media, internet and computer technology 
make secrecy a much harder to obtain and sustain and large swaths of people in rich and poor 
countries have access to news information. It makes the adversaries being coerced more 
sensitive to the optics of compliance. A deadline which effectively is an ultimatum can make 
compliance harder than a more diplomatic formulated, but still stark sense of urgency.  The 
conceptual refinement including “limited force” explicitly in the minimum condition as 
Jakobsen intended did not influence the outcome of the hypothesis- testing and was more a 
sematic than substantial change.  
Ideal Policy Weaknesses: It is worth reiterating the weaknesses of the ideal policy 
conceptual framework to emphasize what it explains and what it does not explain. The main 
weakness it the black- boxing of the adversary; it does not consider motives and intensions or 
the inner workings of an adversary, such as regime type (democracy or authoritarian state), 
institutions (federal or unitary, centralized army or many security units etc.) and domestic 
politics (is there great opposition to use of force?). Black- boxing prevents the ideal policy 
framework from capturing potential changes in the adversary’s balance of domestic power 
caused by the threats or use of force, which could influence its external security policy. The 
black- boxing make devising coercive mechanisms and coercive diplomacy campaign in real- 
time very difficult (although the comparative analysis of this thesis looks at coercer’s 
intentions and some of the coercive mechanism and instruments). However the ideal policy 
can be used to predict whether a coercive diplomacy attempt is likely to succeed in a future 
coercive attempt. It also determines whether a coercive attempt was successful or not post 
hoc. If all the conditions had been present and the outcome unsuccessful, the ideal policy 
could indicate indirectly that the failure was caused by miscalculation or misperception or 
some of the other variables left out of the framework. The measurement of success is in itself 
a weakness because the dichotomous, binary way of measuring success or failure does not 
always represent the complex real world. The Schelling logic of non-zero sum conflicts 
indicates a compromise where no one gets everything, so a coercer might get some of its 
demands but not all. Is that a success? Or if the coercer gets what it ask for, but with some 
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amendments? Or what if let’s say Iran was coerced into the nuclear agreement, but turned out 
not complying with the agreement and instead got the weapons 10 years down the road. 
Would the coercive diplomacy bringing the agreement in the first place be deemed a success?     
The rationality assumption is good for theory building, but has some inherent weaknesses. 
Decision makers does not always have all important information or knowledge of cause and 
effect to make value- maximizing decisions, and risk making decisions under a cloud of 
uncertainty(Viotti&Kauppi2010:43), so even if we don’t know or base the decisions on the 
adversary, there are still a potential risk of states not choosing the utility maximizing strategy. 
The ideal policy does not take into account ideologies, psychology, culture and values, 
nevertheless it assumes that probability of success can be assessed by solely looking at the 
adversary(Jakobsen2016:285).In doing the literature review for the thesis; there was cited 
psychological, ideational, and cultural and value explanations. Davidson saw “prestige” in the 
UK and French leaders as important motivation for pushing regime change. Other sources 
doubted it was possible to coerce Gadhafi given his anti- western ideological commitment 
“yet anyone who believed that the threat of international action would force Qaddafi to back 
down clearly did not know him. Admitting defeat, especially at the hands of his most reviled 
enemies, was not an option for the proud Bedouin of the desert, who remained as defiant as 
ever”(Pargeter2012:235). The rationality of Gadhafi can also be disputed, was he crazy or 
insane? Did he become totally irrational when painted into a corner? Counter- evidence for 
that is the outreach he actually did and that he was coerced in the turnaround case. Another 
weakness is inherent in the case study method, the low number of cases makes the 
representativeness of the theoretical success limited, and the relative causal mechanism, 
between the theoretical conditions difficult to assess.   
6.2 Comparative Analysis  
Why did the first case succeed and the second fail? The slightly amended “ideal policy” 
framework to P.V. Jakobsen correctly predicted a positive outcome in the WMD turnaround 
case and a failure in the humanitarian coercion case. The “structured focused comparison 
method” helps inform a thoroughly comparative analysis of the two cases by only looking at 
the same and relevant aspects of the phenomenon in the two cases. The analytical focus is the 
four minimum requirements for coercive diplomacy success manifested in the ideal policy 
framework, but the qualitatively approach allows us to also assess the strategic context, the 
coercer’s intentions and the utility of coercive instruments and mechanisms as well. There is 
no doubt the definitional basis for coercive diplomacy was present in both cases. The U.S. 
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and allies communicated threats of military force to coerce Gadhafi undo and abandon his 
WMD program and stop him from carrying out mass atrocities in Benghazi. According to the 
abstract theory undo should be more difficult than to stop, so how come the U.S. succeeded in 
the first case, but failed in the second?   
An assessment of the strategic context should be the beginning of the analysis to identify the 
similarities and differences in the environment the threats was issued and decisions made, 
before looking more narrowly on the four minimum requirements. The WMD turnaround in 
2003 came after a radical change in the U.S. security policy caused by the 9/11 events. The 
reorientation outlined in the National Security Strategy 2002 expressed a more assertive 
stance towards terrorism and nuclear proliferation and a willingness to use force for 
preemptive causes and “go it alone” if necessary. There was no other superpower in the world 
to constrain the U.S and the escalatory danger a military confrontation could pose was not 
present in the Libyan cases. The Bush Administration consisted of several “neoliberal” hawks 
pushing for military action abroad, so the change was not only manifested in policy 
documents and rhetoric, but came into concrete action in Afghanistan and Iraq. This 
compelled all supporters of terrorism and nuclear proliferation to review and recalculate the 
costs and benefits of rouge behavior, and consequently all communication from Washington 
was interpreted accordingly.  
The humanitarian coercion in 2011 came in another context. The four main differences was 1) 
the U.S. and Europe was still recovering from the biggest financial crisis since the Great 
Depression and had less resources for external military spending 2) The U.S. public was hit 
by war fatigue and skepticism toward the usefulness of foreign military adventures 3) The 
great power-shift from West to East had escalated quicker than anticipated making a “pivot” 
to Asia a foreign policy priority 4) President Obama was more skeptical to use of force 
(opposed the Iraq War from the beginning), and preferred multilateral over unilateral action. 
The Obama Administration had influential voices opposing and supporting the use of force, 
the former was strengthen by the NSS 2010 and Obama himself, so the net- effect was 
arguably that U.S. adversaries saw him as less likely to use force than his predecessor.     
The starting point of the structured focused comparison analysis is whether, how and why “a 
threat of force or limited use of force to defeat the opponent or deny him his objectives 
quickly with little cost” was issued. This is needs to be analyzed based on the nature of the 
demand, how much is asked for, what the interests at stake are and whether the balance of 
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capabilities made the objective attainable with little cost. The WMD turnaround was a 
unilateral coercive diplomacy attempt (although the UK was part of the diplomatic part of the 
interaction) while the humanitarian coercion case was a coalitional coercive effort. The 
American unilateral coercion had one clear end goal, of vital national interest, to prevent 
nuclear proliferation and stop and undo Gadhafi’s WMD program. This was important for 
several reasons; it could start a nuclear arms race in the Middle East and Africa threatening 
Israel and European NATO- allies, the nuclear deterrent could shield Libya from foreign 
intervention and reactivate the regimes support for terrorism, it could increase the possibility 
of nukes overtly or accidentally falling into the hands of terrorists, and the technology and 
know-how could be exported to other rogue regimes. Any ulterior motives of wanting regime 
change or economic benefits were secondary to the non- proliferation goal. The clarity and 
importance of the objective made the coercive threat more credible and diplomatic 
negotiations easier for the American side. 
The WMD turnaround coercion hinged on one coercer, but two types of threats: an 
unequivocal, demonstrated use of force in Afghanistan and Iraq, implicitly showing all 
nuclear proliferators that they might be next in line, and veiled threats communicated by 
certain members of the Bush Administration. The new strategic context after 9/11 had 
demonstrated an American willingness to use force in Afghanistan, and act without consent 
from the UN Security Council and without support by many European allies in Iraq. This 
commitment was also stated in the National Security Strategy from 2002, allowing unilateral 
action and “preemptive strikes” to hinder nuclear proliferation and reiterated as veiled threats 
by several members of the Bush Administration. President Bush’s decision to let central 
members of his administration keep up the heat, while the negotiators engaged in mutual trust 
and confidence building, made the threat credible and negotiations more efficient. 
This dual approach of veiled threats combined with diplomatic messaging from the American 
side served the diplomatic aspect of the strategy without compromising the credibility of the 
coercion. There was never any doubt that the will and ability to use force was present, but 
both sides gave time and effort in finding a negotiated solution following Schelling’s logic of 
non-zero-sum conflicts. The evidence for the fact that Gadhafi perceived the threat is found in 
several sources from within the regime and in Gadhafi’s conversations with international 
leaders where he expressed fear of American military power. However, Gadhafi publicly 
claimed it was a diplomatic rather than a coerced solution and portrayed the deal as a win-win 
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solution, although he later claimed to be unsatisfied by not getting assurances against a WMD 
attack towards Libya and help to convert the WMD program to civilian use.  
The humanitarian coercion attempt was a coalitional coercive diplomacy effort executed 
mainly by the France, the UK and the US, with additional military support from NATO 
members, regional support from the Arab League, and legal justification from a UN Security 
Council. The reason for a coalitional approach is found in President Obama’s general 
reluctance to unilateral action and fear of getting entangled in another foreign war. This 
“leading from behind” style forced the otherwise free-riding European allies, having greater 
stakes in the outcome of a Libyan crisis, to be more proactive. The coalitional efforts brought 
greater resources militarily and economically, in this case first by a “coalition of the willing” 
before NATO with its great organizational capacity took control of the operation on the 30th 
of March. The European leadership was something new as “the increasing disparities in skill 
and equipment between the U.S. and European allies has diminished the usefulness of their 
contributions”(Byman&Waxman2002:155). Still the operation was dependent on American 
power, and leadership in the initial phase, although several European states gave significant 
contributions. 
George identifies coalitional efforts as “likely to be more difficult than when its employed by 
a single actor, although it brings international pressure and greater resources, the unity and 
sense of purpose of a coalition may be fragile”(George1993:70). One major problem with 
coalitional coercion is the danger of “eroding the potency and credibility of the coercion, as 
the leaders tries to accommodate conflicting priorities of the coalition members with respect 
to use of force”(Byman&Waxman2002:152). The main priorities agreed upon by all three 
coercers in this case were to prevent mass atrocities in Benghazi and uphold the emerging 
norm of “responsibility to protect”.  Initially the means to reach the objective was to threaten 
Gadhafi to change his behavior, both formally through UN Resolution 1970 and by unilateral 
threats from each coalitional state.  Later as the conflict developed, the use of force became 
necessary, but it was soon evident it lacked limited intent, and amounted to brute force. This 
led some to claim it was a mission creep, others to argue regime change had been the 
objective all along. This begs the question if the three coercers had secondary objectives and 
interests leading to the failed coercion attempt and producing regime change. Taking into 
account the geopolitical location of Libya, France and UK had higher stakes in the military 
operation than the U.S., and their secondary goals can have been instrumental in the 
escalation to brute force.  
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British and French interests: There are several additional interest explaining France and the 
UKs role in pushing for regime change in Libya. They have closely cooperated on defense 
policies since 1998 with the St. Malo declaration(Lindley-French2015:98), and the military 
operation was an opportunity to prove the effectiveness and value of the cooperation, and to 
show that both leaders were able to use force and provide leadership at the world 
stage(Matlary2013:117). The support for military force were driven by desire to reassert the 
countries as great powers, and back up their initial actions to prove resolve and strength. The 
intervention was popular in France at the time, and Sarkozy facing reelection within a year, 
saw it as an opportunity to strengthen his personal favorability, and increase his chances for 
electoral success.  
The British review of the Libya mission “Libya: Examination of intervention and collapse 
and the UK’s future policy options “ found several other French motives for intervention; “a 
desire to gain a greater share of Libya’s oil production (the country had burned bridges to the 
Gadhafi regime by early demands for regime change), increase French influence in North 
Africa, give in to domestic pressure groups materialized in close ties between Libyan exiles 
and the French intellectual establishment, and an opportunity to take proactive stance in the 
Mediterranean and in addressing French concerns over illegal immigration to Europe from 
North Africa (not least important with Marine Le Pen as one of the presidential contenders) 
(HoC2017:10/11). The immigration concerns were shared by the UK with Prime Minister 
Cameron having an immigration skeptic electorate and serious contender in UKIP actively 
seeking those votes. Libya’s location in Europe’s neighborhood made preventing a flow of 
refugees not only an electoral issue, but a factual geopolitical interest. Ironically, as we now 
know, the lack of a strong central government in post- Gadhafi Libya made the intervention a 
refugee catastrophe in its own right.  
David Cameron had also faced criticism for imposing severe defense cuts outlined in 2010 
Strategic Defense Review(Chivvis2014:37), and saw the use of force as an opportunity to 
restore his security politics credentials.  A military intervention and regime change gave a 
moral victory an outcome of a muddy coerced negotiation could not provide, and could easier 
be translated to domestic electoral support. It also recalibrated the two countries approach to 
the Arab Spring, where especially France had come out on the wrong footing, having had too 
close ties and cozy relationships with the former dictators in North Africa. The relationship 
with Gadhafi was already broken, so it was better to promote a new leadership to avoid 
renewed terror threats from the regime and protect economic interest. The political risk was 
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minimal, the UN Mandate averted criticism from the opposition parties, and the intervention 
had wide public support. It was also clear both countries believed military intervention could 
be successful at relatively low cost, while non- intervention would not solve the 
problem(Davidson2013:310). Alliance solidarity and dependency is often the imperative for 
smaller NATO countries to participate in joint military operations, this was probably a 
consideration for France (Sarkozy had brought them back into the NATO military command) 
and the UK too.  
U.S Interests: The U.S however “did not ultimately go to war because its allies asked it to do 
so, or because of the Arab league vote … it was the  imminent threat and a workable military 
option to protect the civilians that brought the U.S. into the operation”(Chivvis2015:21). It 
had been slow to support the pro- democracy activists during the Arab spring and burned 
bridges to Gadhafi as the other two main coercers, so even from an economic perspective 
getting rid of the colonel could be in their interest. Yet economic cooperation is a two way 
street and Gadhafi would have been dependent on American and European technology, 
investments and know- how in a post crisis relationship. The U.S. did not have any strong 
regional strategic interests in Libya as in Egypt, but the geopolitical proximity to Europe 
favored supporting allies to prevent an inflow of migrants from a potential civil war zone.  
The U.S. also has a long term- strategic goal and ideological commitment to individual 
liberties and free markets institutionalized in the Bretton Woods system and the UN. The 
support of the R2P doctrine in the Libyan case bolstered U.S. commitment to promote human 
rights and democracy, it can be argued the intervention supported long term political and soft 
power interests. 
There is no rule or norm to always interfere in a looming humanitarian catastrophe, many 
wars goes unnoticed because they are of low national interest for the great powers. 
Intervention is not driven by the amount of the suffering or number of deaths, but made on 
case by case decisions, often based on mundane causes like closeness to the homeland or 
allies’ territory, or acting on concerted media and NGO campaigns. The Libyan case 
represents a case in point with strong media attention around the world pressuring key 
persons in the U.S. (and French) executive branch advocating for military action. On the 
American side, the trifecta of women; Samantha Power, Anne Marie Slaughter and Susan 
Rice apparently convinced Secretary of State Hillary Clinton that military force was needed, 
and her pressure helped turnaround a cautious Obama into taking action(Matlary2013:117). 
Clinton’s support was reinforced and ‘the American position shifting’ when she met 
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opposition leader Jibril during the G-8 meeting mid- March in Paris on Sarkozy’s initiative 
(Matlary2013:117), although she seems to downplay her role in her memoir “Hard Choices”, 
probably to hedge her bets before the presidential campaign. The main strategic imperative 
for the US, besides protecting civilians was probably not to be entangled in another Middle 
Eastern mess. Aptly described by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates “In my opinion, any 
future defense secretary who advises the president to again send a big American land army 
into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should have his head examined…”(Shanker:2011). 
The fact that protection of civilians could be done with only air power, couple with ‘all means 
necessary’ when threats had proved futile, made intervention a possibility. So, if we accept 
the assumption that civilians could be protected with Gadhafi in power, U.S. interest would 
also have been protected by a successful coercive diplomacy attempt, resulting in Gadhafi 
remaining in power or with a slower power transition progress unfolding. 
This review of the three countries strategic interests to intervene, show that all three countries 
could have fulfilled their main goals “protecting civilians” and supporting the R2P principle 
by engaged in good faith negotiations with Gadhafi after the threats was made and military 
force employed, but for France and UK, the secondary goals would not have been fulfilled. 
These strategic objectives explain why the threats were not communicated efficiently and the 
eagerness to push for a regime change trumped a successful coercive diplomacy attempt. 
Sadly, this resulted in the coercive threat’s lack of impact on Gadhafi’s behavior. Likewise, 
the US did not have a clear end game strategy, besides not being entangled in another foreign 
quagmire, so a regime change seemed like an acceptable outcome for the Obama 
Administration. These factors can explain the forward leaning European approaches towards 
the adversary and the brute force producing regime change. The elaboration of European 
motives may seem odd in an analysis revolving around American coercive diplomacy 
attempts, but it illustrates the consequences of the choice to take a backseat role in coalitional 
efforts. The American power to shape the end game was reduced. It was allowed in this case 
because the alternative endgame was not estimated to be better and regime change would 
fulfill the main objectives. The cost is twofold: power vacuum and a failed state in Libya and 
reduced credibility next time Americans issue assurances against regime change because they 
didn’t keep their words from 2003. The next section will illustrate how the mission creep 
influenced how the threats were communicated. The communication influenced Gadhafi’s 
calculation of the threats and made him underestimate the likelihood for the use of force, and 
see resistance as a better option than compliance.  
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Communication of threats: The U.S Administrations communication made it clear from the 
outset that Gadhafi had to stop his plans to carry out the atrocities. The U.S ambassador to the 
UN Susan Rice stated as early as February 28 “We have been very clear that we have a range 
of options … that we’re considering” and only a few days later and two weeks before NATO 
Intervened Obama warned “The violence must stop; Muammar Gadhafi has lost legitimacy to 
lead and must leave; those who perpetrate violence against Libyan people will be held 
accountable”(Kidwell2015:118). Secretary of Defense Robert Gates illustrated for Gadhafi 
what the Americans had in mind when he testified to Congress and explained the utility of a 
no- fly zone(Kidwell2016:119). There were concerns if it was possible to achieve the 
objective with a no-fly zone, because the regime was attacking people on the ground, so just 
taking out Gadhafi’s air power would not be sufficient to stop the atrocities. The allies would 
need to bomb the forces attacking people, and thus creating effectively a no- drive zone. This 
made it necessary  “to push for a broad mandate in the next Resolution (1973), including ‘all 
necessary means’, which some European diplomats thought was a disingenuous tactic aimed 
at dividing the Security Council”(Chivvis2015:20). The passing of the Resolution 1973 
became the strongest and most credible communication of threat towards Gadhafi, but he was 
not given time to comply before allied forces had started the military operation.  
The rationality behind Gadhafi’s non- compliance hinges on the credibility of the threat. 
There are good reasons for why Gadhafi might have underestimated the credibility of the 
threat and believed an allied intervention wouldn’t materialize. The strategic context were as 
mentioned different from 2003; demonstrated by Obamas reluctance to use force based on 
economic costs, domestic opposition and past policy failures. He’s inclination to a 
multilateral approach in international politics and the awareness of the bad optics of another 
American unilateral or “coalition of the willing” effort in the region made the threat de facto 
contingent on UN Security Council approval. The U.S. does always reserve the right to act 
unilaterally, but the humanitarian coercion case was of low national interest, increasing risk- 
averseness and reluctance to act. Therefore, Gadhafi had good reasons to expect a UN 
mandate and regional support was politically necessary conditions for military action. The 
UK’s public emphasis on legality or a “sound legal basis” (essentially UN mandate), for 
taking action reinforced this belief. The UK also had internal disagreements; “Cameron met 
more resistance to intervention among his military establishment and the British National 
Security Strategy’s 15 criteria for use of force did not support the Libyan 
intervention(Matlary2013:118).  Moreover, if the threat was conditioned on a UN Resolution 
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he could have expected a veto from Russia or China. There is evidence that even some allies 
of the coercers didn’t really believe in the Security Council process would end with approval 
of use of force, which confirms the rationality of Gadhafi’s underestimation of the credibility 
and sense of urgency of the threats. The counter-arguments are the French and apparently 
British willingness to act without a mandate. The French threat was initially conditioned on 
regional support and deteriorating developments on the ground, and despite seemingly 
adhering to a UN mandate publicly, French politicians/diplomats expressed willingness to 
intervene regardless of a mandate later confirmed by Bernhard Levy (Matlary2013:117), who 
also claimed the UK was prepared for the same 
The underestimation of the credibility of the threat was coupled with the distrust created by 
the calls for regime change. Obama, Cameron and Sarkozy all called for Gadhafi to step down 
early on in the process. France communication was particularly blunt; with French demands 
for regime change and Gadhafi to step down and early support for ICC investigation and 
recognition of the NTC. The early support of ICC was necessary to anchor the UN mandate 
on the R2P principle allowing states to break the non- interference norm to protect civilians 
facing crimes against humanity. However, the public criminalization of Gadhafi by Obama 
and Sarkozy made a negotiated solution more difficult to achieve and reduce the confidence 
and trust between Gadhafi and the coercers. 
The Resolution 1973 made Gadhafi perceive the gravity of the warnings and threats, and the 
legality of an operation and regional support made the threat even more credible. The 
credibility of the initial threat prior to Resolution 1973 could have been supported with 
Schelling’s advice of setting a clear deadline or the use of brinkmanship to give Gadhafi the 
last clear chance to alter his course. There are reasons to ask if a clear threat had been 
conveyed from the outset with such a firm deadline, if Gadhafi’s behavior could have been 
altered and Libya could have had a more peaceful power transition. That is by no means 
certain given the cross pressure for regime change from within and without, the sense of 
urgency was high for Gadhafi throughout the rest of his reign, but he clearly underestimated 
the willingness to use force, or didn’t see any alternatives than to endure it. Likewise, when 
the operation had started, could there have been a negotiation in good faith with Gadhafi, or 
was it impossible to imagine him staying in power ultimately or for a transitional period?  
The time from the resolution’s (1973) adoption to it was set in motion was too short for 
Gadhafi to comply with the demands. The swift French military action “caused an uproar” 
among the allies not least Berlusconi, seeing the French breaching the norm of letting the old 
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colonial power leading a crisis in its former dominions(Clinton2014:373). However, drawing 
on lessons from previous coalitional efforts and as the one with the most capabilities, made 
the U.S. initially taking command. The U.S. control and leverage could have had a dual use, 
both protect civilians which it eventual did, and worked as a limited use of force in a coercive 
diplomacy attempt. The latter was never really pursued if we are to believe Kuperman’s 
account of the proceedings, however Obama administration officials says there was outreach 
to Gadhafi, but that it was conditioned on his abdication(Chollet&Fishman2015:155).  
Balance of capabilities: A coercer needs to calculate its ability to deny the adversary its 
objectives with little cost. It’s the dynamic part of the coercive diplomacy; it depends on the 
end goal for the coercion and the military, economic and societal strength of the adversary. It 
informs which coercive instruments best suited for the coercive diplomacy attempt, and which 
other negative and positive inducements options and reassurances available. The ideal policy 
does not guide the use of specific mechanisms and instruments in real time because it require 
more detailed knowledge of the adversary, but it can be included in a post hoc explanation. 
The asymmetry in capabilities made calculations of whether the U.S. enjoyed escalation 
dominance and found Libyan pressure points rather easy. Gadhafi had a vital pressure point, a 
strong weakness, because he couldn’t guard his air space. American and Western airpower 
created escalation dominance, the ability to increase the threatened cost to an adversary while 
denying the adversary the opportunity to neutralize those costs or to counter-
escalate(Byman&Waxman2002:30). “Gadhafi’s command and control structure was flawed, 
its communications was poor, and initially strikes virtually eliminated its ability to mount 
meaningful defense against coalition airpower”(Kidwell2015:149). The fact that the 
Resolution 1973 greenlighted use of force beyond a no- fly- zone by the inclusion of “all 
necessary means”, should have made it clear to Gadhafi that he was bound to lose, and made 
him raise the white flag, since it led to a de facto no- drive zone to prevent Gadhafi’s forces 
from go on the offense and attacking the rebel held areas on the ground. The extreme 
asymmetry in the balance of capabilities made the calculations clear for both sides from the 
outset, and also confirmed post hoc for the WMD turnaround case with the actual use of force 
in the second coercive diplomacy attempt.    
In 2003, the “rally-round-the-flag effect” was still in play in the US, and war fatigue was not 
yet an issue. The US had demonstrated its effective use of air power in the Balkan wars, 
Afghanistan, and started a campaign in Iraq, and Gadhafi had felt it firsthand in the late 
1980ies. Gadhafi had no options to prevent the American battlefield success, given superior 
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American air power. He would not even have capacity to inflict pain, which could influence 
an otherwise risk adverse democracy. The military threat was real and Gadhafi knew by 
experience and rational calculations that the US would be willing and able to carry it out. The 
WMD turnaround saw some non- military coercive instruments in addition to the threats of 
force and regime change. There was already severe economic sanctions, so the threats was 
work in synergy with the gradually worsening economic situation making Gadhafi ripe for 
compliance of coercion. The sanctions had caused technological problems in the oil and gas 
sector and low oil prices reinforced Libya’s economic weaknesses. Slow economic growth 
impacted the economic situation in the country, high levels of inequality and unemployment 
could create popular dissatisfaction. The economic weakening of the country through the 
sanctions had opened the possibility for a “power base erosion”, although Gadhafi’s position 
remained secure, there was voices within the administration that wanted to get rid of the 
obstacles hindering a diplomatic and economic normalization. Targeting the military or 
security services or other ethnic groups can be ways to undermine the regime’s support. 
Gadhafi’s security edifice was designed to “be coup proof”, “he had purposely kept his armed 
forces weak and divided – to the point where the army was regularly described as more of a 
‘military club’ than a fighting force”(Pargeter2012:224). He had also staffed the security 
services with family members and people from his tribe with rapport and loyalty to him, in 
fragmented units to avoid any of them being strong enough to overthrow all the other. There 
was little evidence at the time such targeting was employed or even realistic to succeed in the 
first case, but Gadhafi understood the security need for improving the economy 
The nature of the demand and the strength of the adversary inform the military calculation for 
the coercer. Humanitarian coercion cases are of little national security interest, and 
consequently the second Libyan operation was planned with high risk averseness and casualty 
sensitivity. “Preventing any casualties often becomes for the military higher priority than any 
positive objectives”(Byman&Waxman2002:184). The weakness of Gadhafi made the air 
power sufficient for a successful outcome, and made use of force a viable solution. The 
Americans and the French emphasized this as the main reason to partake in use of force, and 
“French officials believed a low-cost air-only intervention could cripple the Gadhafi 
regime”(Davidson2013:317), likewise; “U.S. policymakers… the no fly zone appeared to 
provide a low- risk, low- cost potential solution to the problem of using the military option 
under limited conditions”(Kidwell2015:115). The fact that the mandate included protection of 
civilians and all necessary means, made military planners “contemplate the implications of 
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conducting air to ground strikes not only against military assets and civilians to establish the 
zone but also against advancing regime troops, which necessitated consideration of atypical 
sources and methods to acquire the resources, combat support and specific skill set 
required(Kidwell2015:118). This did not change the calculations, the expectations was still 
that air power was safe as soon as Libyan air force was destroyed, so the main worries in the 
military operation became to avoid collateral damage and keep within the mandate. It was still 
up to the rebels on the ground to foster a regime change. This is one of the reasons Edward 
Luttwak has been critical of western military interference “because multinational commands 
engaged in disinterested intervention tend to avoid any risk of combat, thereby limiting their 
effectiveness”(Luttwak1999:39) and humanitarian intervention is the worst creating endemic 
conflicts(Luttwak1999:43/43). The risk averseness has made air power the preferred military 
tool, and much used coercive instrument, but with limited shock effect and precision.  
The use of air force in humanitarian coercion case threatened the regime’s relationship with 
its power base by strengthening the alternative power center. It shows that a domestic 
opposition doesn’t have to be created by the coercer, but can grow organically and when it 
has formed, defections from the regime, in this case diplomats can be useful to boost morale 
and support the coercer’s narrative- in a form of “propaganda war”. These defections helped 
create a sense of urgency, because the diplomats voiced concerns to an international audience 
about the unfolding atrocities, and gave legitimacy to the intervention and TNC. Gadhafi 
experienced regional power base erosion in 2011 and while his grip on Tripoli remained, the 
eastern regions became alternative power centers, and helped support what quickly turned 
into unrest. This unrest was organically, and not imposed intentionally from abroad. The US 
and allies sought a bandwagon strategy, cooperating with the rebels after they had taken the 
initial steps in fomenting popular disaffection, supporting them with air power protection and 
weapons (Qatar). 
It can be argued that the use of air power became part of a leadership decapitation effort, 
seeking to jeopardize the Libyan regime’s personal security. This is definitely problematic 
from a legal point of view, and would not have been pursued as an official American strategy, 
but be a consequence- collateral damage- of another expressed objective. The leadership 
decapitation caused by allied airpower in 2011 relied on Libyan support. The western 
coalition implemented a no- fly zone, which became a de facto a no-drive zone, and helped 
domestic opposition groups or rebels to overthrow the government and killing Gadhafi on the 
ground. However, there is indications that leadership decapitation was the American strategy 
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in 1986, when the air campaign was directed at Gadhafi’s HQ, and caused one of his family 
member’s death.(Pape1996:80) George1993:56). Pushing for power base defections or unrest 
threatens the regime from the inside and can make the regime less receptive for coercion. 
Security is always priority number one, and when Gadhafi’s survival was threaten from 
within and outside, and the western demands would straitjacket him in his effort to secure his 
standing domestically, the external threat of the coercive attempt seemed less urgent. This 
weakness can be used as leverage by the adversary in the negotiation part of coercive 
diplomacy. Gadhafi could have asked for more economic support or concessions, because his 
rule was in danger, an example of this is when he sought enough power to handle the 
Islamists threat in the second case. 
Sense of urgency: The sense of urgency in the turnaround case is disputed; Stevens detected 
only moderate sense of urgency, while Jakobsen indicating it was higher based on the pace of 
previous negotiations efforts, and sincerity in complying with the Lockerbie and WMD issues 
before 9/11; “the Libyan behavior prior to 9/11 and the fall of Baghdad was devoid of any 
sense of urgency or fear of escalation”(Jakobsen2012:501). The indirection of BBC China 
“caught him red- handed and Gadhafi ended Libya’s WMD programs while the offer of 
normalized relations was still on the table”(Haun2015:136/137). This argument is as shown in 
the outline of the cases, based on clear evidence in Gadhafi and regime official’s statements.  
In the humanitarian coercion case the sense of urgency was as earlier described, undermined 
by conditional caveats like regional support, deteriorating developments on the ground and 
most importantly the wish to have a UN mandate.  The Presidents willingness to use force 
was more restrained than his predecessor, so the effectiveness of the veiled threats coming 
from voices inside the administration favoring use of force was hampered. The legality 
conditions impact on the credibility of the threat, is illustrated by the evidence that the passing 
of the UN Resolution 1973, caught not only Gadhafi, but also NATO countries (like 
Germany) with surprise, both the fact that it passed and its broad parameters for 
implementation. It made the military threat being converted into tangible action, it allowed for 
“all necessary measures”, and called for a no fly zone, but no ground invasion. 
The sense of urgency became all the more real with the passing of UN Resolution 1973. It left 
any coercive doubt aside, the member states were ready to interfere with military force. 
Indeed within a day or two after the resolution passed, French planes was in the air. This gave 
too little time to have a meaningful coercive effect of the threat, there was no time for 
compliance between the threats of use of force in the Resolution 1973 and it came into force. 
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However, a coercive attempt is not necessarily over with the use of limited force. The 
establishment of new facts on the ground could give the coercers leverage in a final 
negotiation with Gadhafi, giving a wide range of end goal options. The coercive diplomacy 
opportunity was squandered by not offering any real inducements or assurances, and not be 
part of a good faith diplomatic effort.  
The role of inducements and assurances: is another stark contrast between the two cases. 
This can give a role for forceful persuasion because “these inducements can be vital for 
compliance, since they give the adversary a way to save face and play down the costs of 
concessions, by decreasing the political costs of capitulation” (Byman&Waxman:9) and it 
avoids making the conflict a zero sum game. The WMD turnaround had many inducement 
options that influenced the favorable outcome, while the second case lacked any good faith 
negotiation efforts and tangible inducements to encourage Gadhafi to comply. The Bush 
administration inducements was beneficial for the Libyan regime given its lackluster 
economy, and fear of internal discontent.  Gadhafi got most of what he wanted with sanctions 
lifted, return of US oil companies, normalized diplomatic relations, and assurances against 
regime change, although he alter complied about not getting assurances against WMD attack 
and help to convert military nuclear technology to civilian use. The deal breaker for Gadhafi 
and his most important priority were regime survival. The strong and repeatedly assurances he 
got from the Americans, shifting their security policy objectives from regime change to 
WMD- policy change, secured a successful outcome.  
The humanitarian coercion case did not involve the same type or amount of carrots. There is 
little evidence inducements or assurances were used in any meaningful or efficient way to 
compel Gadhafi. It is indeed hard to think of proper inducements for a leader to abstain from 
slaughtering his people. Gadhafi’s mixed response of defiance and willingness to negotiate 
might have obfuscated the prospect for a coercive diplomacy solution. This response was a 
result of the seriousness of the resistance Gadhafi met in large part of his country, only raw 
military force could keep him in power. The same force that made the West intervenes in the 
first place. There might not have been a realistic middle ground that could keep him in power 
and halted the confrontations between the rebels and government forces.  
There was diplomatic communication during the intervention, but no scenario gave Gadhafi 
anything near a real carrot or positive inducement, the best he could hope for and tried was 
the promise of an election down the road, but it was not accepted by the rebels, or given 
consideration by the allies. As the operation went on, there might have been possible to 
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negotiate a ceasefire and controlled power transition, with the abdication of Gadhafi as leader 
to influence the endgame for the country and avoid civil war. Allegedly, Gadhafi proposed 
some potential inducements and assurances himself, when offering, “to stop all combat, 
withdraw forces to outskirts off the cities and assume a defensive posture”, but this was not 
accepted by the allied forces and rebels. He neither got assurances for staying in power, nor 
an orderly power transition lead by people both he and the rebels could support. He was said 
to be willing to step down and support a power transition if a request for safe passage for his 
inner circles and enough force to fight radical islamists were approved(Kuperman2015:1). 
Imagine if the coercers saw this as a solution, they could have offered a safe passage not only 
for his inner circles, but for Gadhafi himself and his family. Coupled with an agreed amount 
of money and assets and assurance against an ICC process, and it might be the inducements 
and assurances needed.  
This is counterfactual speculations, but it illustrates the roads not taken. It’s hard to see what 
kind of inducements there could have been attached to a negotiated solution, possibly the 
undoing of the measures implemented by the first Resolution 1970. A reversal of the punitive 
measures implemented by Resolution 1970 which imposed sanctions, arms embargo and 
travel bans on officials and an asset freeze on Libya. The arms embargo would not be on the 
table for the coercers, since it prevented Gadhafi from rearming against the rebels.  The early 
calls for ICC investigation effectively made this solution costlier for the coercers than it 
needed be. The formal investigation, necessitated by the R2P principle, undercut any prospect 
for these solutions. Gadhafi living the high life in an African capital would certainly not 
enhance French or British leaders electoral prospects, or made the numerous western human 
rights NGO’s satisfied.  
Given the lack of the two last theoretical conditions and even a suboptimal implementation of 
the threat and lack core national interests, it’s not surprising the initial humanitarian coercion 
failed, and escalated from limited use of force to brute force and regime change. Officially, 
this has to be labeled a mission creep, given the Resolution 1973 did not ask for regime 
change. However, “President Barack Obama identified regime change as a core objective in 
his March 28, 2011, address to the nation stating that Qaddafi “needed to step down from 
power.”(Haun2015:186). This was probably the end goal all along, given calls for Gadhafi’s 
to step down even before the coercion started, “NATO’s implementation of air superiority 
before dispersing his conventional forces with air strikes, while covertly arming and training 
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Libyan rebels”(Haun2015:186) and the lack of plans for a post- intervention relationship with 
Gadhafi.  
Ultimately, better strategic thinking with a clear end goal could have avoided many of the 
problems. None of the three coercers seemed willing to investigate the possibilities of a more 
orderly power transition process spurred by a serious coercive diplomacy attempt. The 
divergent interests and lack of end game, made the regime change the inevitable outcome, of 
what escalated from limited the use of force to brute force. If coercion had been pursued after 
the force was set in motion and the people in Benghazi had been saved. It could have been 
possible to avoid the power vacuum on the ground with the zones of lawlessness feeding 
Europe’s migrant crisis. Gadhafi could have been willing to negotiate an ordered power 
transfer or stop threatening his own people. The operation would also have increased the 
likelihood for future R2P missions, although this case seems like an exception given Russia’s 
leadership rotation and China’s lack of strategic interests. A fourth option is always in 
Edward Luttwak’s words to “give war a chance”, or more accurately let war work, to get a 
more “organic” solution to the conflict. Western interventions with suboptimal solutions risks 
doing more harm than good when the final death tallies are in.   
This comparative analysis of the two cases illustrates the feebleness of the humanitarian 
coercion attempt. The four theoretical conditions crystalize the most important aspects of 
coercion attempts, and there was clearly a lack of will over ability to pursue coercion properly 
in the humanitarian case. There are reasons to ask, if coercive diplomacy can succeed in 
“humanitarian interventions” founded on legality through the UN Security Council. The 
effectiveness of the coercion would probably have been better without the UN process 
moreover there are reasons to ask if the main goal protection of civilians could be achieved 
with Gadhafi still in power, or with him agreeing to a peaceful power transition. The three 
countries had different purposes for taking action and leadership, besides the narrow goal of 
“responsibility to protect” by hindering a humanitarian catastrophe. The most important 
objective was clearly the prevention of mass atrocities, but not necessarily the only reason and 




























7. Conclusion:  
The conceptual development and refinement made the ideal policy framework more inclusive, 
but reduced some of its explanatory range and specificity. The theory- testing confirmed that 
the “ideal policy” framework’s minimal conditions for coercive success held up against new 
empirical cases. The American coercive diplomacy attempt towards Muhamad Gadhafi’s 
Libya was successful because the coercer established a sense of urgency and synergistically 
combined the coercive and diplomatic conditions of coercion, inducements and assurances. 
The coercive effort was based on a clear calculation of escalation dominance and ability to 
deny Gadhafi his objectives with little cost. The coercion was expressed in a series of implied 
and veiled threats based on demonstrable military action in Afghanistan and Iraq, and by 
statements coming from Administration officials. The interdiction of BBC China made it 
impossible for Gadhafi to deny the existence of his WMD program. These three factors came 
together and created a strong sense of urgency. It was combined by wide range of valuable 
inducements and assurances. Gadhafi were promised normalization of diplomatic and 
economic relations, help to convert the WMD technology and join the “War on Terror” to go 
after internal Islamists in his country. More importantly he got repeated assurances of 
American commitment against regime change if he agreed to abandon the WMD program.  
The humanitarian coercion failure was also predicted correctly by the ideal policy framework. 
It was a coercive diplomacy failure, because it did not combine the coercive and diplomatic 
aspects of the theory. There was issued threats in the form of statements by the main coercer’s 
leadership, but those were initially impeded by de facto conditionality caveats, implying need 
for regional support, deteriorating conditions on the ground, and UN Security Council 
approval. The threat and sense of urgency became more real with the passing of Resolution 
1973, but the time given for compliance between the adoption of the Resolution and use of 
force was too little. French eagerness to lead the military effort gave little time for compliance 
between Resolution 1973 and the use of force. The coercive attempt is not necessarily over 
with limited use of force, but allied effort to negotiate a deal with the Gadhafi regime was at 
best half- hearted, more likely non-existent. The limited force escalated to brute force and 
regime change. No tangible inducements or assurances were offered. The way the military 
operation was conducted, going beyond a no- fly zone to a no- drive zone was important to 
protect civilians, but also indicates the goal was regime change from the beginning. This is 
supported by the ulterior motives for the UK and French leaders, and the American 
unwillingness to be bogged down in another foreign war. The theoretical insights of Schelling 
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to create a non- zero sum conflict and use brinkmanship and a deadline to reinforce the 
credibility of the threat was not utilized. Nevertheless, the ideal policy correctly identified and 
predicted both the failed and successful coercive attempt. The inherent weaknesses, makes it 
difficult to evaluate the relative importance of each theoretical condition or find causal 
mechanism beyond the need for all four conditions to be present.  
The structured, focused comparison method allowed us to make thorough comparisons of the 
two cases looking at the same aspects in both instances. The fact that Gadhafi had been 
coerced in a previous attempt can confirm his rationality, and that he was able to accept a 
negotiated outcome if offered proper inducements and assurances. The use of limited and later 
brute force in the second coercion case confirms the American balance of capabilities 
calculations made in the first case. The U.S. enjoyed escalation dominance and could deny 
Gadhafi any coercive pressure points and made this a low- risk military intervention. The first 
case indicated that threatening with regime change could make Gadhafi yield, while the same 
threat was less effective in the second case because he was threatened from outside and 
within. The people the coercers sought to protect were the same threatening his regime. The 
first case also confirmed Art’s (2004) empirical finding that positive inducements should not 
be offered before credible threats are conveyed. The implication for theory is that the ideal 
policy conditions should be implemented to enjoy coercive diplomacy success. The power to 
hurt based on the balance of capabilities proved necessary to achieve a successful outcome 
adding to the successful empirical track- record of the ideal policy. The amendment by 
including “sense of urgency” seems necessary in today’s world, but lowers the stakes and 
makes brinkmanship and creation of situations where the adversary has to make the tough 
decisions harder to achieve. However, translating coercive diplomacy theory into successful 
policy is not easy. It requires favorable strategic context, implementation of the ideal policy 
conditions and a well- executed strategy. Strategy within the foreign policy realm, is an 
overarching plan to achieve policy goals in dynamic relationships between states (and non-
state actors), in an environment of anarchy and uncertainty.  Strategic thinking at political 
level is often constrained by lack of resources, political considerations and risk- awareness 
and fear. A coercive diplomacy strategy should therefore involve setting policy goals, 
prioritize the importance of them, and outline what kind of action needed to achieve the goals. 
It thus describes which means and resources we need to achieve the end goal. It’s the 
responsibility of the leadership of a state to pursue strategic thinking; formulate the goal, 
allocate resources and willpower necessary to reach it, and abandon or adjust the objective, if 
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it proves impossible or undesirable to reach. The ideal policy informs some of the means to 
reach the end, but individual agency and a more incisive assessment of coercive mechanisms 
and instruments may still be needed to translate the theoretical knowledge into strategic 
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